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PEREZ v. SHARP
(32 C.Id 711: 188 P.2d 17)
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ANDHEA D. PEREZ et aI., Pl!titioners, v. W. O. SH..\UP,
as County Clerk, etc., Respondent.

-)

!

/

/

[1] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Religious Free¢om.
-Ill view of the guaranwe of religious freedom in U- S. Const.,
Aml'nd. ~, stnte legislatures Ilre no more competent than
Congr('ss to cnaet a law prohibiting lhe free exerci!"e of roligioll, though they may regulatE' cOLduct for the prowctioD
of society, and insofar as their regulations are directed ~
wards n proper end and are not unreasonably discriminatory,
they may indirectly affect religious activity without infringing ~hc eonstitutional guarantee. (Per Traynor, J., Gibson,
C. J., Carter, J.)
[2] Marriage-Nature.-Marriage is so-uething more than R civil
contract subject to regulation by the state; i~ is n fundllmental
right of free men. There can be no proh~!Jition of marriage
except for an important social objective and by reasonable
means.
[31 Id.-Legislative Control.-Legislation infringing on the right
to marry must be based on more than prejudice and must be
free from oppressive discrimination to comply with the constitutional requirements (f due process and equal protection
of the laws. (Per Traynor, J., Gibson,C. J., Carter, J.)
[41 Id.-Validit1-M...rriages Between Dift'erent Races.-A state
law prohibiting members of one race from marrying members
of another race is invalid unless it is designed to meet a clear
RDd present peril arising out of an emergency.
[5] Id.-Nature.-The right to marry ia !he right of individuals,
Dot of racial groups. (Per Traynor, J., Gibson, C. J., Carter, J.)
[6] Id.-Legislative ControL-While disease that might become
a prril to a prospective spouse or to the offspring of the marriftl::(' could be made a disqualification for marriage, :egislation
10 that t>ffect must be based on tests of the individual, not on
arbitrary nlassifieations of groups or races, and must be administered without discrimination on the grounds of raCle.
(Pcr Traynor, J., Gibson, C. J .• Carter, J.)
[1J See 5 Oal.Jur. 724; 11 Am.Jur.1l00.
\ [2J See 16 Cal.Jur. 904; 35 Am.Jur. 182.
MeX. Dig. References: [1] Constitutional Law, § 115; [2,5] MarringI', §l; [3, 6] Marriage, § 3; [4, 7, 8] Marriage, 119; [9]
Stnil1tes, § 37.
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[7] Id. - Validity - Marriages Between Dift'erent Raoos. - Civ.
Code, §§ 60, 69, prohibiting man-illgcs between white persons
and members of certain racial groups, are invalid because
they discriminate against persons on the basis of race or
color and are not designed to meet a clear and present danger.
[8a, 8b] Id.-Validity-Marriages Between Dift'erent Races.-Civ.
Code, §§ 60, 69, prohibiting marriages between white persons
and members of certain racial groups, are invalid not only liS
violating the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution and as arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating against
certain racial groups, but also because they are too vague and
uncertain to constitute a valid regulation. (Per Traynor, J.,
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J.)
[9] Statutes-Validity-OertaiDty.-The requirement that a law
be definite and its meaning ascertainable by those whose
rights and duties are governed thereby applies not only to
penal statutes, but also to laws governing fundamental rights
and liberties. (Per Traynor, J., Gibson, C..T., Carter, J.)

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel county clerk to
issue a certificate of registry and a license to marry. Writ
granted.
Daniel G. Marshall for Petitioners.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and
Charles C. Stanley, Jr., Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-In this proceeding in mandamus, petitioners seek to compel the County Clerk of Los Angeles County
to issue them a certificate of registry (Civ. Code, § 69a) and
a license to marry. (Civ. Code, § 69.) In the application for
a license, petitioner Andrea Perez states that she is a white
person and petitioner Sylvester Davis that he is a Negro.
Respondent refuses to issue the certificate and license, invoking
Civil Code, section 69, which provides: ". . . no license may
be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person with a
Negro, mulatto, Mongolian or member of the Malay race."
Civil Code, section 69, implements Civij Code, section 60,
which provides: " All marriages of white persons with negroes,
Mongolians, members of the Mnlay race, or mulattoes are
illegal and void." This section originally appeared in the
Civil Code in 1872, but at that time it prohibited marriages
only between white persons anll Negroes or mulattoes. It
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succeeded a statute prohibiting SUell lIIarriages and autllOriz·
ing the imposition of cerlain criminal pI'nalties upon persons
contracting or solemnizing them. (Stats. 1850, ch. 140, p. 424.)
Since 1872, Civil Code, sectioll 60, hilS been twice amended.
first to prohibit marriages betwe(,11 whitE' persons and Mongolians (Stats. 1901, p. 335) and subsequently to prohibit
marriages between white persons and members of tbeMalay
race. (Stat.'!. 1933, p. 561.)
Petitioners contend that the statutes in question are unconstitutional on the grounds that they prohibit the free exercise
of their religion and deny to them the right to participate
fully in the sacraments of that religion. They are members
of the Roman Catholic Church. They maintain that since
the church has no rule forbidding marriages between Negroes
and Caucasians, they are entitled to receive the sacrament
of matrimony.
[1] The provision of the First A.mendment to the Constitution of the United States that Congress shall make no
law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof" is encompassed in the concept of
liberty in the Fourteenth A.mendment. State legislatures
are therefQre no more competent than Congress to enact such
a law. (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 [60 S.Ct.
900,84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352].) They may, however,
regulate conduct for the protection of society, and insofar
as their regulations are directed towards a proper end and
are not unreasonably discriminatory, they may indirectly
affect religious activity without infringing the constitutional
guarantee. Although freedom of conscience and the freedom
to believe are absolute, the freedom to act is not. (CantweU
v. Connecticut, "'pra, at pp. 303-304.)
The regulation of marriage is considered a proper function of the state. It is well settled that a legislature may
declare monogamy to be the ulaw of social life under its
dominion," even though such a law might inhibit the free
exercise of certain religious practices. (Reynolds v. United
8tates, 98 U.S. 145, 166 [25 L.Ed. 244]; Datlu v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333, 343 [10 S.Ct. 299, 83 L.Ed. 637].) If the
miscegenation law under attaek in the present proceediug
is directed at a social evil and employs a reasonable means
to prevent that evil, it is valid regardless of its incidental
effect upon the conduct of particular religious groups. If,
on the other hand, tnt' law is discriminatory and irratiollal,
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it tmcoD,titu1iuDnlly restrict;; not only religious

lib~rty but
the liberty to DUlrry ac; well.
The due proc(,~!l clau!;c of the Fourteent h Amendment
prutects an arcn of pcr~oll:l.l liberty not yet wholly delimited.
"While this Court h:t.., not attempted to define with exuctnf'~
the liberty thus gunranteed, t.he term has received much eonsidt:ration and some of the included things have been rldinitdy
titntcd. Witbout doubt, it d.:notE's not merely frccrlolll frol1l
bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to wntrnet, to r:n~ag(' in any of the common occnpation8 of lifc,
to a('quire usl'ful knowled$!c, to marry, establish a hOlll(' anll
brin~ up children, to worship God accordin~ to the dictates
of hit> own consciencc, and, generally, to enjoy thosl~ privile~rcs long r~co~nized at common law as essential to thc orderly
purHuit of happiness by free men." (Italics addl:d; Mr;yer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 [43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042].)
[2] Marria!!,\:! is thus something more than a civil contract
8ubject to r~gulation by the state; it is a fundamental right
of free men. There can be no prohibition of marria,:re eXcl'pt
for an important social objective and by reasonable means.
No law within the broad areas of state interest may be
unreasonably discriminatory or arbitrary. The state's intprest in public education, for example, does not empower the
Legislature to compel 8chool children to rec<>ive instruction
from public teachers only, for it would thereby take away the
right of parents to "direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control." (Pierce v. Society of Sister"
2G8 U.S. 510, 534-535 [45 8.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R.
468] .) At.!llin, the state's vital concern in the prevention
of crime Ilnd the mental health of its citizens docs not empower the Legislature to deprive "individuals of n ril!'ht
which is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right to have
offspring" by authorizing thE' sterilization of criminals upon
an arbitrary basis of classification and without a fair hearin~.
(Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 [62 8. Ct. 1110,
86 L.Ed.1655].p

I

/

1 f;ct' also the conl'urring opinion of JllelI80n, J., indicating tbat
etl'rilization of I'riminals as a hiological experimpnt. might be invalid:
"There are limits to tb(' extent to which a il'gislatively represented
mlljority may conduct biologi('al experiml'nts at the expense flf tho
dignity Antl personality and nntural powers of a minority-even tboso
who hn\'"c h(,pn guilty of what the majority define as crimes. But this
Act falls down before reaching this problt'm, which I mention only to
avoid the impli!':Jtioll tlillt SIlt'h n qu{'stion mllY not pxist hecaus(' not
discl1l<s('d. On it 1 would also reserve judgmcnt." (31U U.S. 54U·GU;
IKle (;1 Yale L.J. 1380.)
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'I'be right to marry is as fundamental as the right to send
olle's chHd to a particular schoo] or the right to have offsprinf1;.
Indeed, "We are dealing here with legislation which involves
one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." (Skinner v. Oklahoma, mpra, at p. 541.) [3] Legislation
infringing such rights must be based upon more than prejudice and must be frce from oppressive discrimination to comply
with the constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
I
Since the right to marry is the right to join in marriage
with the person of one's choice, a statute that prohibits an
individual from marrying a member of a race other than his
own restricts the scope of his choice and thereby restricts his
right to marry. It must therefore be determined whether the
state can restrict that right on the basis of race alone without
violating the equal protection of the laws clause of the United
States Constitution.
•, Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For
that reason, legislative classification' or discrimination based on
race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [6 S.Ot. 1064, 30
L.Ed. 220) ; y" Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 [46 S.Ct.
619, 70 L.Ed. 1059]; Bill v. Tuas, 316 U.S. 400 [62 S.Ot.
1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559]." (Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 [63 S.Ot. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774].) In the Hirabayashi case the United States Supreme Court held that despite the fact that under the Constitution of the United States
"racial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant
and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows that, in dealing with the perils of war, Congress and the Executive are
wholly precluded from taking into account those facts. and
circumstances which are relevant to measures for our national
defense and for the successful prosecution of the war, and
which may in fact place citizens of one ancestry in a different
category from others. . . . The adoption by Government, in
the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of measures for
the public safet.y, based upon the recognition of facts and circumstances which indicate that a group of one national ex-
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traction may menace that safety more than others, is not
wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and is not to be
condemned merely because in other and in most circumstances
racial distinctions are irrelevant. . . . The fact alone that attack on our shores was threatened by Japan rather than
another enemy power set these citizens apart from others wh()
have no particular association with Japan." (320 U.S. 81,
100-101.) Whether or not a state could base similar measures
on the peril caused by a national emergency in the face of the
equal protection of the laws clause of the United States Constitution, which does not apply to the federal government, it
clearly could not make such a distinction based on ancestry
in the absence of an emergency.
[4] A state law prohibiting m~bers of one race from
marrying members of another race is not designed to ml.-ct
a clear and present peril arising out of an emergency. In the
absence of an emergency the state clearly cannot base a law
impairing fundamental rights of individuals on general assumptions as to traits of racial groups. It has been said that
a statute such as section 60 does not discriminate against Imy
racial group, since it applies alike to all persons whether
Caucasian, Negro, or members of any other race. (In re
EBtate 0/ Paquet, 101 Ore. 393, 399 [200 P. 911].) The decisive question, however, is not whether different races, each
considered as a group, are equally treated. [6] The right
to marry is the right of individuals, not of racial groups. The
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution does
not refer to rights of the Negro race, the Caucasian race, or
any other race, but to the rights of individuals. (State of
Missouri e::e I'll. Gaines v. Oanada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 [598.Ct.
232, 83 L.Ed. 208] ; McOabe v. Atchison, Topeka ct Santa Fe
By. 00.,235 U.S. 151, 161-162 [35 S.Ot. 69, 59 L.Ed. 169].)
In construing the equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has declared
that the constitutionality of state action must be tested according to whether the rights of an individual are restricted
because of his race. Thus, in holding invalid state enforcement of covenants restricting the occupation of real property
on grounds of race, the Supreme Court of the United States
declared: "The rights created by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the
individual. It is, therefore, no answer to these petitioners
to say that the courts may also be induced to deny white

)
j

Oct. 1948]

)

PEREZ V. SHARP
132 C.2d 711: 118 P.:Id 171

717

persons righfs of oWIll'rr;hip and Ot!cuJlam~y on grounds of
race or color. Erjual prol<'dioll of th(' lawfl is not achieved
through indiscrimillaie illlpositioll of inequalities." (Skelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 [68 S.Ct. 836, 846, 92 L.Ed. - ] . )
In an earlier case, where a Negro contended that the state's
failure to gh'e him equal facilities with others to' study law
within the state impaired his constitutional rights under the
equal protection clanse, the court rejected any consideration
of the difference. of the demand for legal education among
white persons and Negroes, stating: "Petitioner's ri'ght was
a personal one. It was as an individual that he was entitled
to the equal protection of the laws, and the State was. bound
t.o furnish him within its borders facilities for legal education
substantially equal to those which the State there afforded for
persons of the white race, whether or not other negroes sought
the same opportunity." (State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Oanada, 305 U.S. 337, 851 [59 8.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208] ;
8ipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 [68 S.Ct. 299, 92
L.Ed. --J.) Similarly, with regard to the furnishing of sleeping, dining, and chair car facilities on trains, the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that even though there was
less demand for such facilities among Negroes than among
whites, the right of a member of the Negro race to substantially
equal facilities was a right of the individual and not of the
racial group:" It is the individual who is entitled to equal protection of the laws, and if he is denied by a common carrier,
acting in the matter under the authority of a state law, a
facility or convenience in the course of his journey which,
under substantially the same circumstances, is furnished to
another traveler, he may properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded." (McOabe v. Atckison,
Topeka cf Santa Fe Railway 00., 235 U.S. 151, 161, 162 [35
S.Ct. 69, 59 L.Ed. 169].) In these cases the United States
Supreme Court determined that the right of an individual
to be treated without discrimination because of his race can
be met by separate facilities affording substantially equal
treatment to the members of the different races. A holding
that such segregation does not impair the right of an individual to ridE' on trains or to enjoy a legal education is clearly
inapplicable to the right of an individual to marry. Since
the essence of the right to marry is freedom to join in marriage with the person of one's choice, a segregation statute for
ma;riage necessarily impairs the right to marry.

)
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[6] In determining whether the public interest requires
thc prohibition of a marriage between two persolls, the st:lt,
l!lny talte into consideration matters of legitimate concern to
the state. Thus, disease that might become a peril to th('
prospc:ctive spouse or to the offspring of the marriage could
be made a disqualification for marriage. (See for example,
Civ. Code, §§ 79.01, 79.06.) Such legislation, however, must
be based on tests of the individual, not on arbitrary classifications of groups or raCel;, and must be administered without
discrimination on the grounds of race. (Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 373 [6 8.Ct. 1064,30 L.Ed. 220].) It has been
suggested that certain races are more prone than the Caucasian to diseases such as tuberculosis. If the state determines
that certain diseases would endanger a marital partner or
offspring, it may prohibit persons so diseased from marrying,
but the statute must apply to all persons regardless of race.
Sections 60 and 69 are not motivated by a concern to diminish
the transmission of disease by marriage, for they make race
and not disease the disqualification. Thus, a tubercular Negro
or a tubercular Caucasian may marry subject to the race
limitation, but a Negro and a Caucasian who are free from
disease may not marry each other. If the purpose of these
sections was to prevent marriages by persons who do not
have the qualifications for marriage that the state may properly prescribe, they would make the possession of such qualifications the test for members of all races alike. By restricting the individual 'sright to marry on the basis of rnce alone,
they violate the equal protection of the laws clause of the
United Statp.s Constitution.
II
The parties, however, have argued at length the question
whether the statute is arbitrary and unreasonable. They have
assumed that under the equal protection clausc the stnte mny
classify individuals according to their race in legislation rcl!Ulating their fundamental rights. If it be assumed that fluch a
classification can validly be made under the equal protection
clause in circumstances besides those arising from an emergency, the question would remain whether the statute's
classification of racial groups is based on differences betwt't'n
those groups bearing a substantial relation to a legitimate
leS!'islative objective. (Barker Bros., Inc. v. Los Angeles, 10
Cn1.2d 603, 609 r76 P.2d 97] ; G1Ilf etc. R. Co. v. Ellis, Hi5
U.S. 150, 165, 166 [17 S.Ot. 255,41 L.Ed. 666] ; Quaker Oit~
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Call Co. v. Pe1l'tlSylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 400 [48 S.Ct. 553,
72 L.Ed. 927].} Race restrictions must be viewed with
J!TC:lt llWlpicion, for the Fourteenth Amcndrnt'nt •• was adopted
to prevent statc lCJriRlation desil.mcd to dil'lcriminl1te on the
baBis of race or color" (Railway !lail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 32fi U.S.
88, 94 [65 S.Ct. 1483, 89 L.Ed. 2072]; Williams v.InteNtational Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Ca1.2d 586, 590 [IGS
P.2d 903]) and expresses "a definite national policy against
discriminations because of race or color." (James v. Marin.hip Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 740 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R.
900].) Any state legislation discriminating against persons
on the basis of race or color has to overcome the strong prtsumption inherent in this constitutional policy. UOnly the
most exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination on
that basis in the face of the equal protection clause . . ."
(Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 [68 S.Ct. 269, 275,92
L.Ed. --].) We shan therefore examine the ·history of the
legislation in question and the arguments in its support to
determine whether there are any exceptional circumstances
IJUfficient to justify it.
California's first miscegenation statute (Stats. 1850, ab.
140, p. 424) was enacted at the same time as two other statutes concerning race. It has been held that these three statutes were in pari materia and therefore to be read together.
(Estate of Stark, 48 Cal.App.2d 209, 214 [119 P.2d 961].)
The two companion statutes provided: "No black or mulatto
person. or Indian, shall be permitted to give evidence in favor
of, or against, any white person. Every person who shall have
one-eighth part or more of Negro blood shall be deemed a mulatto, Rnd every person who shall have one half of Indian
blood shall be deemed an Indian." (Stats. 1850. ch. 99, § 14,
p. 230; repealed Code Civ. Proc., § 18, 1872.) "No black, or
mulatto person; or Indian, shall be permitted to give evidence
in any action to which a white person is a party, in any Court
of this State. Every person who shall have one eighth part or
more of negro blood, shall be deemed a mulatto; and every
person who shall have one half Indian blood, shall be deemed
an Indian." (Stats. 1850, ch. 142, § 306, p. 455; repealed Code
Civ. Proc., § 18, 1872.)
In 1854, -this court held that Chinese (and all others not
whitt') WE're precluded from being witnesses against white
persons 011 the basis of the st.ntlltt' qnotE'c1 above. (People v.
Hall,4 Cal. 399, 404.) The considerations motivating the de-
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clSlon are candidly aet forth: • The anomalous spectacle of
a distinct people [Chinese}, living in our community, recognizing no laws of thiR State except through necessity, bringing with them their prejudices and national feuds, in which
they indulge in open violation of law j whose mendacity is
proverbial; a race of people whom nature has marked as in·
ferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual
development beyond a certanl point, as their history has
shown; differing in languag~, opinions, color, and physical
conformation j between whom and ourselves nature has placed
an impassable difference, is now presented, and for them is
claimed, not only the right to swear away the life of a citizen,
but the further privilege of participating with us in administering the affairs of our Government." (People v. HaU,
,upra, at pp. 404-405.) For these reasons, therefore, "all
races other than Caucasian" were held to be included in a
statute referring only to a "black or mulatto person, or
Indian."
California courts are not alone in such utterances. Many
courts in this country have assumed that. human beings can
be judged by race and that other races are inferior to the
Caucasian. Respondent's position is based upon those premo
ises. He justifies the prohibition of miscegenation on grounds
similar to those set forth in the frequently cited case of Scott
Y. State (1869),39 Ga. 321, 324: "The amalgamation of the
races is not only unnatural, but' is always productive of
deplorable results. Our daily observation shows us, that
the offspring of these unnatural connections are generally
sickly and effeminate, and that they are inferior in physical
development and strength, to the full blood of either race."·
Modern experts are agreed that the progeny of marriages between persons of different races are not inferior to both parents.- Nevertheless, even if we were to assume that inter·

)

I

/
./

/

I Respondent refers to the following language ill StAte v. JGC'Ie.oa,
80 Mo. 175, 1711 [50 Am.Rep. •99), althougb stating that "we have
not fuund an1 other atatement to bear out the biological elaima"
therein: •• It is 8tat('d as a wt'lJ authenticated fact that if the issue of a
black man IUld a white woman, and a white man and a blaek woman
into)'marl1, they cannot pouibl1 have any procen1, and such a fact
sufficiently justifies those JaWl which forbid the illterma.rria.p of
blacks and 1\'bites, la1inl out of view other su1licient Irounda for auh
enactments.' ,
" Sec, enstIe, Biological and Sociological Consequences of Raee Crt'S8ing. II Am. J. of Pbysi"al Antbrullology, pp. n5, 152,153; Linton,
Stt'rlillg Pruf('ssor AntliropoJogy, Yale Uni.,. and PnlIIid('nt of the
AUlCri"lm Antbropological Asaocintion, 64 Am.Mure. p. 133 (FcbnlaJ'1
1947) •
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racial marriage re.'1ults· in inferior progeny, we are unable
to find any clear poliey in the statute against marriages on
that ground.
[7] Civil Code, section 60, like most miscegenation statutes
(see, Vernier, American Family Laws, § 44), prohibits marriages only between "white persons" and members of certain
other so-called races. Although sectioll, 60 is more inclusive
than most miscegenation statutes, it does not include •'Indians" or "Hindus" (see, United States v. Bhaga' Singh
TMnd, 261 U.S. 204, 214-215 [43 S.Ct. 338, 67 L.Ed. 616j);
nor does it set up •'Mexicans" as a separate category, although
some authorities consider Mexico to be populated at least in
part by persons who are a mixture of "white" and "Indian."
(See, 15 Encyclopedia Britannica, pp. 381-382, 60 Harv.L.
Rev. 1156-1158.) Thus, "white persons" may marry persons
who would be considered other than white by respondent '.
authorities, and all other "races" may intermarry freely.
The Legislature therefore permits the mixing of all races
with the single exception that white persons may not marry
Negroes, Mongolians, mulattoes, or Malays. It might be concluded therefrom that section 60 is based upon the theory
that the progeny of a white person and a Mongolian or Negro
or Malay are inferior or undesirable, while the progeny of
members of otber di1rerent races are Dot. Nevertbeless, the
section does not prevent the mixing of "white" and "colored"
blood. It permits mamagt'S Dot only between Caucasians
and others of darker pigmentation, such as Indians, Hindus,
and Mexicans, but between persons of mixed ancestry including white. If a person of partly Caucasian ancestry is yet
classified as a Mongolian under section 60 because bis ancestry
is predominantly Mongolian, a considerable mixture of Caucasian and Mongolian blood is permissible. A person ba\ing
five-eighths Mongolian blood and three-eighths white blood
could properly marry anotber person of preponderantly
Mongolian blood. Similarly, a mulatto can marry a Negro.
Under the theory of Estate of Stark, supra, that a mulntto
is a person having one-eigbth or more of Negro ancestry. a
person having seven-eighths white ancestry could marry a
Negro. In f~ct two mulattoes, each of four-eighths white and
four-eighths "Negro blood, could marry under section 60, and
their progeny, like tJlem, would belong as much to one racc
as to tile other. 1n t'fft>(·t. thl'r('for(', sCI·tion 60 pl!rmits a
substantial amount of illtl'rllllll"l"iagl~ bctween persom; of l"Om.f.
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Caucasian ancestry Rnd members of other rll.c<."8. Furthermore, there is no b:m on illicit sc.~n!ll rcl:ltiollS between Caucasians and mcmbl~l'S of tbl! proscribed races. Indeed, it ill
covertly (!D.cour8.llcd by the race restrictions on marrint;ru.
Ncvcrthekss, respondent bn." sou/!ht to justify the 1'ItiltutC
by contending that the prohibition of intcrm:lrri:\f:cbctwccn
Caucasians and members of the specified races preVl!nts the
Caucasian race from being contaminated by moc'S whose
members are by nature physically and mentally inferior to
Caucasians.
Respondent submits statistics relating to the physical inferiority of certain races. Most, if not all, of the oilmtnts
to which he refers are attributable largely to environmental
factors. Moreover, one must take note of the statistics showing
that there is a higher percentage ofeertain diseases among
Caucasians than among non-Caucasians.' The categorical
statement that non-Caucasians are inherently physically inferior is without scientific proof. In recent years scientists
have attached great weight to the fact that their segregation
in a generally inferior environment greatly increases their
liability to physicalailments.1I In any event, generalizations

/
./

/

, Between 1980 and 1939 in California deaths reaulted mOlt frequentq
from didea&Ies of the circulatory IIYstem, particularly heart diseases.
TJaese diseases were most prevalent among white persons, not including
Mexicans, with the exception of· Chinese, who slightly exceeded white
puraoDil. The eeeond mOlt important caUIe of death was cancer; here,
white persons ueeeded a)) others without exception. Tuberculosis, an
important cause of death, occurs with greater frequency among Negroes
than among white persons. not including MexieaDs; but Mexieans,
Indiana, Chinese and Malays have materially higher death rates owiDr
totubereulosis than Negroes and Japanese. Diaea8ell of the nervoua
system occur with lcsa frequency among Indiana, Japanese, Mexicans,
aDd MalaYII than among white penons, Negroes, and ChiD08e. (Tho
Population of California, Commonwealth Club of California Relk!8reh
Ht'lvien (1946) pp. 217 et seq.)
Rl'llpondent'a contention that fertiUt7 of Negroes and mulattoes fa
low is questionable. (See note 8, II1lpra) Dr; S. J. Holmes (1937) The
Negro's Struggle for Survival, p. 176, states: "The fact is that wo
h"vc not adequate data on a aufficiently large seale to enable us to
. decide how the mixed origin of the mulatto affects fertility, if it
a1foetli it at all." Although Negro fertility rutes are gtlnt'rally Iflwl'r
than those of white persons, other nOD·whftCll far exer"d white's in
birth ra.te. Further, tht' fertility rate of Rural·farm Nf'grOl'.8 (:%('f't'ds
that of Rural·farm whites. Scientists givc varioua int«'.rpretatioDa of
statistics on fertility, analyzing them in the light of environmental as w.!ll
as hl.'rl'ditary fadors. (Population of Californi:t, n"ra, pp. 212 ct IINJ.;
lee I Myrdal, p. 134, ell. '7.)
." Reo, I Myrdal, pp. 140-)44; S. J. Holm''8,Tht' Negro'a RtrDgglo
for ~u1"Viyal. p. )30.
Rrl1pondf'Dt ('onU'Dds, howcv(·r, that tllere ill a: rneial :tilmmt among
Nqcru\:1I known as sickle-cell nnl'min. A('cording to· till' Cycloll('(lia of

)
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based on race are unt.rustworthy in view of the gr('at variation:t
among members of the same race. The rationalization, then'fore, that marriag(' between Caucasians and non-Caucasians
is socially undesirable because of the physical disabilities of
the latter, fails to take account of the physical disabilities of
.Caucasians and fails also to take account of variations among
non-Caucasians. The Legislature is free to prohibit marriages
that are socially dangerous because of the physical disabilities
of the parties concerned. (See, Civ. Code §§ 79.01, 79.06.)
The miscegenation statute, however, condemns certain races
as unfit to marry with Caucasians on the premise of a hypothetical racial disability, regardless of the physical qualifications of the individuals concerned. If this premise were carried
to its logical conclusion, non-Caucasians who are now pre·
cluded from marrying Caucasians on physical grounds would
also be precluded from marrying among themselves on the
same grounds. The concern to prevent marriages in the tirst
category and the indifference about marriages in the second
l"('vea] the spuriousness of the contention that intermarriage
bet ween Caucasians and non-Caucasians is socially dangerous
on physical grounds.
Respondent also contends that Negroes, and impliedly the
other races specified in section 60, are inferior mentally to
Caucasians. It is true that in the United States catalogues
of distinguished people list more Caucasians than members
of other races. It cannot be disregarded, however, that Caucasians are in the great majority and have generally had a
more advantageous environment, and that the capacity of
the members of any race to contribute to a nation's culture
depends in large measure on how freely they may pariicinate
in that culture. There is no scientific proof that one race is
IUperior to another in native ability.' The data on which

/

Kodieinc, Burgol1 and Obetetriea (1946) VoL S, p. 74G, quoWd l,y
1'eSI'onuent, " Statistical studies indicAte that 7 to 8 per cr.nt ot
NegrOCl mow the 8ickle-cell trait, though not necaas:uily suffering trom
Bickle·eelJ anemL,,-" Assuming that the sickle-cell trAit is found ODly iD
Negrocs, despite known extensive iDtermnture of the ~.., rcspondl'nt
has shown only the trait and not the prevalence ot sicklo·eell ant'mia.
Civil Code l14~ction 711.01, which requiraa " premarital blood test, make.
ao provision for a report on sickle-eell anemia.
-Bee, I ll1rdal, pp. 147·148: "These negative conclusions from man,.
cleeades of the moat painstakiDg scientific labor stand in glaring contrast
to the ordiDaJ'7 white AmeriCAn's firm couviction that there Are tunda·
mental psychic differences between Nl'gr~ and whites. The reRson
for this contrast is not 80 mueh that thc' ordinal1 white Amrrienn haR
made an error iD observation, for most 8tudit~s of iDtf>lligl'ncr show that
the avera,o Nerro in the IAIIlplc, if judg(,d b)' perfol1ll.'Ulee Oil tho

/
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Caucasian superiority is based have undcrgone (!onsiaerable
rcevalulltiOll by social and physical scientists in the past two
decades. Although scientists do not discount the influence of
heredity on the ability to score highly on mental tests, there
is no certain correlation between race and intelligence. There
have been outstanding individuals in all races, and there has
also been wide variation in the individuals of all races. In any
evcnt the Legislature has not madl' an intelligence test a prerequisite to marriage. If respondent's blanket condemnation
of the mental ability of the proscribed races were accepted,
there would be no limit to discriminations based upon the
purported inferiority of certain races. It would then be
logical to forbid Negroes to marry Negroes, or Mongolians to
marry Mongolians, on the ground of mental inferiority, or
by sterilization to decrease their numbers.
Respondent contends, however, that persons wiShing to
marry in c:ontravention of race barriers come from the
"dregs of society" and that their progeny will therefore be
a burden on the community. There is no law forbidding marriage among the "dregs of society," assuming that this exprl'ssion is capable of definition. If there were such a law,
it could not be applied without a proper determination of
the persons that fall within that category, a determination
that could hardly be made on the basis of race alone.
Respondent contends that even if the races specified in
the statute are not by nature inferior to the Caucasian race,
the statute can be justified as a means of diminishing race
tension and prevt>nting the birth of children who might become
social problems.

)

. teat, is inferior to the average white person in the aample, and lOme
studies show that the average Negro has certain specific personalit1
differences from the white man, but that he haa madl' an error in
inferring that observed difference. were innate and a part of • nature.'
He has not been able to discern the influence of gross ·environmental
differences, much less the influence of more subtle life experiences. The
fact should not be ignored, however, that he haa also made many
ohservational errors, because hiB observatioDl have been limited and
biased." See, also, Ralph Linton, Sterling Professor of Anthropology,
Yale University, 64 Am.Merc. pp. 133, 139; Joseph Peterson & Lyle H.
Lanier, Studies in the Comparative Abilities of Wbites and Negroes,
No.5, Mental Measurement Monographs (1929); Otto Klineberg, A.
IUudy of Psychological Difft'rI'D('es Betwel'n .. Raeinl" and National
Groups in Europe, Archives of Psychology, No. 132, vol. XX, (1931);
Tbomas Russell Garth (193l) Rae.e Psychology, A Stud1 of Racial
Mental Di:tferences; I !4yrdnl, pp. 144·153; Otto Klineberg, (1935)
Negro Intelligence and Selective Mijrrationj Ruth Benedict (1943) Race:
Science and Politics, pp. 98·147.
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It is true that in somc communities the mnrriage of persnns
of different rac('s may result in tension. Similarly, race tp,nsion
may result from the tmforcement of the constitutional requirement that persons must not be excluded from juries sole:ly on
the ground of color, or segrcl!ated by law to certllin district"
within n city. In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, )11 [3R
S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149J, the Suprl'me Court of the Uniteo
StHt()l; declnrpd unconstitutional a Rtntute forhidding n "white
pCl'Ron" to move illto a block wherl' the p:reater number of
rc,.;idcncl'S were occupied by "colored persons" nno forbidding
a "cnlored person" to move into a block where the greater
number of rpsidences were occupied by "whitp persons." The
cont,·utiun was made that the "proposed segregation will
}lrllJfllltto the public peace by preventing race conflicts." The
CQur[ !;t.nt.f>!l in its opinion that desirable "as this is, and
import.'lIlt as ill the preservation of the public peace, this aim
('.a.n11l1t be :lc('omplished by laws or ordinances which deny
ril-rhtS created or protected by the Federal Constituti{}n."
(31"·, Cttntwell v. State, 310 U.S. 296. 310 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84
L.l~d. 1~13, 128 A.L.R. 13521.)
'rlK d'fect of racl' prejudice upon any community is unqurlStionably df-trimental both to the minority that is singled
ont for discrimination and to the dominant group that would
pl'rpetnatc the prejudice. It is no answer to say that race
tension can be eradicated through the perpetua.tion by Jaw
of tht, prejudices that give rise to the tension. Nor can any
rdinnce be placf'd on the decisions of the United States
Auprt'me Court upholding laws requiring segregation of races
in fncilities supplied by local common carriers and schools,
for that court hns muite it clear that in those· instances the
stut.· must 8t'cmre equal facilities for all persons regardless
of race in ordt'r that no substantive rit!ht be impaired. (Sipuel
v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 [68S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed.
--], [16 U.S. Law Week 4090] ; Afissouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350-351 [59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208].)
In the present ense, however, there is no redress for the serious
restriction of the right of Nt'groes, mulattoes, Mongolians,
and Ma.lays to lllarry; cl'rtllinly there is none in the corrt'spuuding rf'striction of tlU:' right of Caucasians to marry.
A m('mber of amy of t.hffiP rae!'!; may find himself barred by
Inw from marrying til(' pl-rSOIl of his ehoice and that pl'rson
to him mny bl' irreplncl·able. Hllman beings are bereft of
worth and dignity by a doctrine that would make them as
interchange-able as trains,
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Uespondent relies on Pace v. .Alabama, 106 U.S. 583
[1 S.Ct. 637, 27 L.Ed. 207], in whieh the United States
Supreme Court held constitutional an Alabama statute imposiug more severe punishment for adultery or fornication
between a white person and a Negro than for such nets
between individuals belonging to the same race. The All\bama
statute also referred to intermarriage but the court considered
the case as one dealing solely with adultery and nonmarital
intercourse. We are not required by the facts of this ca.c;c
to discuss the reasoning of Pace v. Alabama except to state
that adultery and nonmarital intercourse are not, like marriage, a b&ijic right, but are offenses subject to various degrees
of punishment.
Thc rationalization that race discrimination diminishes the
contncts and therefore the tensions between races would perpetuate the deprivation of rights of racial minorities. It would
justify an abridgment of their privilege of holding office,
of jury service, of entering the professions. The courts have
made it clear that these privileges are not the prerogatives
of anyrace.
It is contended that interracial marriage has adverse
effects not only upon the parties thereto but upon their
prog-eny. Respondent relies on Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 [47
8.Ct. 584, 71 L.Ed. 1000], for the proposition that the state
"may properly protect itself as well as the children by taking
steps which will prevent the birth of offspring who will constitutt' a serious social problem, even though such legislation
must nt'ccssarily interfere with a natural right." That case,
however, involved a statute authorizing sterilization of imbeciles following scientific verification and the observance of
procedural RUarantees. In Bu.ck v. BeU the person sterilized
was the feeble-minded child of a feeble-minded mother and
was herself the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child.
(See, Wclf. & Inst. Code, § 6624.) The inheritability of mental
defectiveness docs not concern us here, for this case doC's
not involve mentally defective persons. The Supreme Court
of the United States later forbade the sterilization of criminals
in 8kt.ner v. Oklahoma, supra, where the Legislature failed
to provide a fair hearing and set up illogical and discriminatory eategories. The racial categories ill the miscegenation
law are 88 illogical and discriminatory as those condemned
. by the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma; and there
is a corresponding lack of a fair hearing.

)
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Respondent mawtains that Negroes arc socially inferior
and have so been judicially recognized (e.g., Wolfe v. Georgia
By. 1M Elec. 00.,2 Ga.App. 499 l58 S.E. 899, 901]), and that
the progeny of a marriage between a Negro and a Caucasian
suffer not only the stigma of such inferiority but thc fear of
rejection by membcrs of both races. If they do, th~ fault
lie!:; not with their partlnts, but with the prejudices in the
community and the laws that perpetuate those prejudices
by giving legal force to the belief that llertain races are iuferior. If miscl·gcnous marriages can be prohibited because
of tt.·nsions su1fered by the progeny, mixed religious unions
could be prohibited on the same ground. 7
Th('re arc now so many persons in the United Statt's of
mlxl'd ancestry, that the tensions upon them are alroody diminishing and are bound to diminish even more in time.'
Already many of the progeny of mixed marriagcs have made
important contributions to the community. In nny event
the contention that the misceganation laws prohibit interracial
marriag(' becaus(' of its adverse dects on the progeny is
belied by the extreme racial intermixture that it tolerates.
For many years progress was slow in the dissipation of
tht' insecurity that haunts racial minorities, for there are
many who believe that their own security depends on its
maintenance. Out of earnest belief, or out of irrational fears,
thcy reason in a circle that such minorities are inferior in
health, intelligeDce, and culture, and that this inferiority
proves the need of the barriers of race prejudice.
Careful examination of the ar.guments in support of the
legislation in question reveals that "there is absent the
compelling justmcation which would be needed to sustain
discrimination of that nature." (Oyama v. Oalifornia, 332
U.S. 633 [68 S.Ct. 269, 272, 92 L.Ed. - ] . ) Certainly
the fact alone that the discrimination has been sanctioned
by thl' state for many years does not supply such justification.
(Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.l [68 s.Ot. 836, 92 L.Ed. - - ] ;
Oyama v. Oalifornia, supra; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Oom.,
334 U.S. 410 [68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. - - ] ; see Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (6S S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. - ] . )
T Indeed,: Father John La }'arge S. J. (1943) The Racc Qucstion and
The Nt'gro (Permissu Superiorum), p. 196, eonsiders the tensions "not
unlike.' ,
8 See, M. J. Herskovits (1930) The Anthropometry of the American
Negro; E. B. Beuter (1931) Baee Mixture; I Myrdal, Pp. 182-183,

1360-1361.
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[Sa] Even if a state could restrict the right to marry
upon the basis of race alone, sections 60 and 69 of the Civil
Code are nevel·theJess invalid because they are too vague and
uncertain to constitute a valid regulation. A certain precision
is essential in a statute regulating a fundamental right. "It
is thl! duty of the lawmaking body in framing laws to express
its intent in clear and plain language to the end that the people
upon whom it is designed to opcrntl! way be able to understand
the It"·gislative "ill." (In re Alpine, 2Ua Cal. 731, 736-737
[265 P. U47, 56 A.L.1:t. 1500] ; ca.'wl'I collected 50 Am.Jur. 484.)
HIt is a fundaml'ntnl rule that no eitizp..ll I:Ihould be deprived of
his liberty for the vi(,lat.ion of a law which is uncertain and
ambiguous." (In rc Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 344, 348 [149 P.2d
689] ; In re Peppers, 1$9 Cal. 682, 686 [209 P. 896] ; United
States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-92 [41 8.Ct. 2!18,
65 L.Ed. 516J; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
[59 8.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888] ; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 [46 8.Ot. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322].)
[9] The requirement that a law be definite and its meaning ascertainable by those whose rights and duties are governed
thereby applies not only to penal statutes, but to laws governing fundamental rights and liberties. (Standard C. ·ct M.
Corp. v. Waugh C. Corp., 231 N. Y. 51, 54 [131 N.E. 566, 14
A.L.R. 1054]; Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267
U.S. 233, 239 [45 s.Ot. 295, 69 L.Ed. 589]; see also State
ex rel. Dickason v. Harris, 158 La. 974, 978 [105 So. 33].)
'l'hus, this court in Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners,
14~ Cal. 590,595 [84 P. 39, 113 Am.St.Rep. 315, 7 Ann.Cas.
750, 3 L.R.A.N.S. 896] declared invalid a statute regulating
the practice of medicine on the ground that its provisions were
too vague and uncertain to govern one's right to practice a
profession. In In re Di Torio, 8 F.2d 279, 281 it was held
that a provision of a statute regUlating naturalization of
aliens was invalid on the same ground. Although the provision in question seemed clear on its face, the court refused
to apply the statute to vacate an order of admission to
citizcnship because I I An act is void where its language appears
on its face to have a meaning, but it is impossible to give
it any precise or intelligible application in the circumstances
under which it was intenued to operate." (1n re Di Tono,
supra at 281 and cases there cited.)
[8b] Section 60 of the Ch·jl COOt' n"r.1arf's void all msl'riag<'s of white persons with Nt>groes, Mongolinns, membel'll

/'

Oct. 1948J

/

PEREZ

v.

SHARP

(32 C.2d 711; 198 P.2d 17)

729

of the Malay race or mulattoes. In this section, the Legislature has adopted one of the many systems classifiying persons
on the basis of race. Racial classifications that have been
made in the past vary as to the number of divisions and the
features regarded as distinguishing the members of each
division. The number of races distinguished by systems of
classification "varies from three or four to thirty-four."
(Boa!',. 7 Encyclopedia of So<:. Sciences. 25, 26.) The Legislature's classification in section 60 is based on the system suggested by Blumenbach early in the nineteenth century. (Roldan v. L08 Angeles County, 129 Cal.App. 267, 273 [18 P.2d
706] .) Blumenbach classified man into five races: Caucasian
(white), Mongolian (yellow), Ethiopian (black), American
Indian (red), and Malayan (brown). Even if that hard and
fast classification be applied to persons all of whose ancestors
belonged to one of these racial divisions," the IJegislature has
made no provision for applying the statute to persons of mixed
ancestry. The fact is overwhelming that there has been a
steady increase in the number of people in this country who
belong to more than one race, and a growing number who have
succeeded in identifying themselves with the Caucasian race
even though they are not exclusively Caucasian. Some of these
persons have migrated to this state; some are born here illegitimately; others are the progeny of miscegenous marriages
valid where contracted and thereforc valid in California.
(Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120, 125.) The apparent purpose
of the statute is to discourage the birth of children of mixed ancestry within this state. Such a purpose, however, cannot be
accomplished without taking into consideration marriages
of persons of mixed ancestry. A statute regulating fundamental rights is clearly unconstitutional if it cannot be reasonably applied to accomplish its purpose. This court therefore
cannot determine the constitutionality of the statute in question on the assumption that its provisions might, WIth sufficient definiteness, be applied to persons not of mixed ancestry.
The only reference made in the statute to persons of mixed
ancestry is the prohibition of marriages between a "white person" and a "mulatto." Even the term "mulatto" is not
defined. The lack of a definition of that term leads to a
special problem of how the statute is to he applied to a
.. See Julian S. Buxley and B. C. Haddon (1936) We Europeans,
A Suney of "Rneial" Probleme, 1-15, 82, 106, 115-131, 215·236.
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person, some but not all of whose ancestors are Negroes." The
only case in this state attempting to define the term "mulatto"
in section 60 of the Civil Code leaves undecided whether a
person with less than one-eighth Negro blood isa "mulatto"
within the meaning of the statute. (Estate of Stark, 48 Cal.
App.2d209, 214 [119 P.2d 961].) Even more uncertainty
surrounds the meaning of the terms "white persons," "Mongolians," and "members of the Malay race."
If the statute is to be applied generally to persons of mixed
ancestry the question arises whether it is to be applied on the
basis of the physical appearance of the individual or on the
basis of a genealogical research as to his ancestry. If the
physical appearance of the individual is to be the test, the
statute would have to be applied on the basis of subjective
impressions of various persons Persons having the same
parents and consequently the same hereditarybaekground
eould be classified differently. On the other hand, if the
application of the statute to persons of mixed ancestry is to
be based on genealogical research, the question immediately
arises what proportions of Caucasian, Mongolian, or Malayan
ancestors govern the applicability of thE.' statute. Is it any
trace of Mongolian or :Malayan- ancestry, or is it Bome unIpecified proportion of such ancestry that makes .a person
a Mongolian or )lalayan within the meaning of section 60'
To determine that a person is a Mon~o1ian or Malayan
within the meaning of the statute because of any trace of

/
/

/

II Black'i Law Dictionary (3d eel.) defines a nlulatto as "A penon
that is the olfspring of a negress b1 a white man, or of a white woman
b1 a negro..•• In a more general sense, a penon of mixed Caucasian
&lid negro blood, or Indian and Negro blood...• Properly a mulatto
ia a person one of whose parents is wholly black and the other wholly
white; but the word does not alwaYI, though perhaps it docs generally,
require 10 exactly e\'en a mixture of blood, nor is ita signification
alike iD all the ltates••.• " The lame lOurce defines a Negro aa
followl: "The word 'negro' means a black man, one descended from
the African race, &lid does not commonly include a mulatto.••. But
tbe laws of the dilferent ltates are not uniform in tbis respect, 80me
including iD the description 'negro' one wbo has one-eiglJtll or more of
African blood. Term 'negro' means necessarily penon of color, but not
every person of color is a 'negro'." The foregoing definitions of
"Mulatto" and "Negro" are substantially tIle ome RR the definitioDs
contained in Bouvier'. Law Dictionary.
See alao I Myrdal, An Americon Dilemma, p. 113: •• Legislation iD
thil respect tends to conform to sooial usage, althongh oftt'n it II not
10 exclusive. In lOme ltates one Negro grnudpnrent defines a penOD
aa a Negro for legal purposes, ill otber states any Negro am'el'tor-DO
tn:1tter how fllr removed--is sufficient_ In the SOllthern state~ itt'fillition.
of 11'110 II a Negro are oft.t>n eonftil'tinJ:. Rine~ re~onstrl1etion. tber!! hal
been a Uondenl'Y to brollcl.'n thl' dl'fillition. The Northl'astem ltate!
,enerally have no definition. of Negro in law."

)
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. such ancestry, however slight, would be absurd. II the classi·
fication of a person of mixed ancestry depends upon a given
proportion of Mongolians or Malayans among his ancestor!!,
how can this court, without clearly invading the province of
the Legislature, determine what that decisive proportion is'
(Spe, Pacific Coast etc. Bank v. Roberts, 16 Cal.2o SOO, 805
[l08 P.2d 439).) Nor can this court assume that a predomi.
nance in number of ancestors of one race makes a person a
Cnucru;ian, Mongolian, or Malayan within the meaning of the
statute, for absurd results would follow from such an assumption. Thus, a person with thrct'-sixtcenths Malay ancestry
might have many so-called Malay characteristics and yet be
('ollsio,reo Ii white person in terms of his preponderantly
white ancestry. Such n person might easily find himself in a
dill'mma, for if he Were r(}garded as n white person under
section GO, he would be forbidden to marry a Maln.y, :md yet
his Malay characteristics might effectively pr<:clnde his mar·
ring,· to :mother white p(}rson. Similarly, a person having
thrl'c-l'ightbs Mon!~olian ancestry might legally be classed as
a whitl' person even thour.h he possessed Mongolian characteristic!!. He might have little opportunity or inclination to
marry anyone other than a Mongolian, yet section 60 might
forbid such a marriage. Moreover, if a person were of foureighths Mongolian or Malayan ancestry and four-eighths white
anc"stry, a test based on predominance in number of ancestors
could not be applied.
Section 69 of the Civil Code and section 60 on which it is
based are therefore too vague and uncertain to be npheld
as a valid regulation of the right to marry. Enforcement of
th(' statute would place upon t.he officials charged with its
administration and upon the courts charged with reviewing
the legality of such administration the task of determining
the meaning of the statute. That task could be carried out
with rf'Spect to persons of mixed ancestry only on the basis of
conceptioD.'l of race classification not supplied by the Legislature. "If no judical certainty can be settled upon as to the
meaning of a statute, the courts are not at liberty to supply
one." (In re Di Torio,S F.2d 279, 281.)
In summary, we hold that sections 60 and 69 are not only
too vague and ~certain to be enforceable regulations of a
fundamental right, but that they violate the equal protection
of the laws clause of the United States Constitution by impairing the right of individuals to marry on the basis of race
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Illou!) anll by arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating

against certain racial groups.
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred.
CAUTER, J., concurring.-It is my considcred OpInIOn
t]lat the statutes here involved (Civ. Code, §§ 60, 6H) arc thl!
product of ignorance, prejudice and intolerancc, and 1 am
happy to join in the decision of this court holding that they
are invalid and unenforceable. This decision is in harmony
with the declarations contained in the Declaration of Independence which are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States and reaffirmed by the Charter of the United Nations,
that all human beings have equal rights regardless of rutc,
color or creed, and that the right to liberty and the pursuit
of happiness is inalienable and may not be infringed becausc
of race, color or creed. To say that these statutes may stand
in the face of the concept of liberty and equality embraced
within the ambit of the above-mentioned fundamental law
is to make of that concept an empty, hollow mockery.
The Declaration of Independence declares: "We hold
these truths to be self evident: That all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these art' life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness; . . ."
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides that: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides: "Section 1. All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The Charter of the Unit<>d Nations contains the following
declaration: "WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DETERMINED: . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the
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equal rights of men and women and of nations larR'e aud
small . . . to promote social progress and better stllndar,ls
of life in larger freedom. . . . And for these endM . . . to
practice tolerance ... " (Preamble.) " . . . in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for funtlamental freedoms for all without distinction as to rl\I!(', 8l':X,
language, or religion . . ." (Ch. I, art. I, § 3.)
In the face of these nutboritative pruuounCI'Dlt!Ut'l the
matter of race equality should be A I':t!ttll.'d mue. It is, at
least, a settled issue 80 fur as the fuudmll':utal law is cllncerned. And the only qul'Stiun before us is whether the
Legislature may enaet a vru.id statute in direct conflict with
this fundamental law. It seems clear to me that it is not
possible for the Leghdature, in the face of our fundamental
law, to enact a valid statute which proscribes conduct on a
purely racial basis. Such are the statutes here involved.
The wisdom of the broad, liberal concept of liberty and
equality declared in our fundamental law should be apparent
to every unprejudiced mind.
The Apostle Paul declared that: "God ... hath made of
one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of
the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed,
and the bounds of their habitation." (The Acts of the
Apostles, ch.17, v. 26.)
Cedric Dover writes in his book "Half-Caste": "Perhaps
our Neanderthal ancestors arose from mixture between apemen of the Ice Age. Perhaps our Neolithic prototypes
emerged from relations between the Aurignacian invaders
of Europe and the local Neanderthals. We shall be content
with the knowledge that miscegenation has influenced human
evolution from the earliest times, that there has not been a
pure race of our species for at lea'lt ten thousand years."
In a letter to Cbastellux in 1785 Thomas Jefferson wrote:
., I have supposed the black man, in his present state, might
not be in body and mind equal to the white man; but it would
b(' hazardous to affirm that, equally cultivated for a few
generations, he would not become so." Notwithstanding this
statement, Jefferson, who was the author of the Declaration
of Independence, made it clear that the Negro is entitled to
~njoy equal1y with others the "unalienable rights of life,
liberty an" the pursuit of happiness. ,.
'flip D<'(')aration of Indppendence is a part of the law of
our land. It is to be found as part of the Statutes at Large
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on page 1 of volume 1. It has been given effect as a legislative enactment (Inglis v. Trustees of the Senlor's Snug
Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 L7 L.Ed. 617], and othcr cas(>s
cited in U.S.C.A., 1 Constitution, pp. 7, 8; Fidelity &- Casualty
Co. of New York v. Union Savings Bank Co., 29 Ohio App.
154 (163 N.E. 221]). It declares that; "All men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness; . . ." No one will question that, so far
as pl)titioners are concerned, this case involves the pursuit
of happiness in its clearest and most universally approved
forUl.
It is a matter of law as well as hic;torical knowledge that
after the Revolution all men were not, in law, equal (Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393 [15 L.Rd. 6~1]). But
it is well to remember that men fought, bled, and died for
the truth of the proposition.
In the Dred Scott case, supra, the truth of the proposition
was questioned and denied in an opinion by Chief Justice
Taney. It is again a matter of historical knowledge that this
decision helped to kindle the fire which brought on the Ch'U
War. In this war men fought, bled and died for their belief
in the essential equality of man.
Abraham Lincoln, in his never-to-be-forgotten Gettysburg
Address, told us, because he was speaking to the future as
well as of the past, that" Four score and seven years ago our
fathers brought forth upon this continent, a new nation,
conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that
all men are created equal." He asked whether "[A Jny
nation, so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure."
The Civil War was supposed to definitely and conclusively
answer that question. This being so, should a state, or even
a number of states, legislate to destroy that ideal when great
wars have been fought to preserve it f An ideal for which
men gave their lives and the lives of their families should be
a precious heritage to be carefully guarded. And yet all men
are not now being given equal treatment!
The freedom to marry the person of one's choice has not
always existed, and evidently does not exist here today. But
is not that one of the fundamental rights of a free people 1
Blackstone said that; "Liberty consists in being limit.ed only
by that Supreme Law which is the expression of abstract
right. " If the right to marrJ' is a fundamental right, then
it must be conceded that an infringement of that right b~'
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means of a racial re::;trictioll is an unlawful infringement
of one's liberty. It is immaterial that perhaps only a few
would wish to marry persons not of their own race or color.
It is material that the few who do so desire have the right
to make that choice. It is only ignorance, prejudice and
intolerance which denies it. Since this state will recognize
as valid a marriage performed in another state between members of these two races it follows that the marriage cannot be
considered vitally detrimental to the public health, welfare
and morals.
.
The Constitution of the State of California, article 1, section 13, provides that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. Due process
of law consists not only of the individual's right to procedural
due process, but his right to substantive due process-that
thtl state, through legislation, shall not deprive him of one
of his" liberties. "
Our Constit.ution, like the Constitution of the United States,
is n restriction upon the powers of the state. Upon this
court devolves the duty of guarding that Constitution and the
rights it protects, as upon the Supreme Court of the United
States devolves the duty of guarding th~ Constitution of the
United States.
The student of constitutional law knows that the Civil War
amendments to the Constitution did not accomplish their
intended purpose, which was to create a real, over-all equality
such as the Declaration of Independence contemplated, and
which such cases as the Dred Scott case prevented from being
realized. (Waite, The Negro in the Supreme Court, 30 Minn.
L.Rev.219.)
In the years following the adoption of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, many court.s still did
not think that there was real equality among men despite
the fact that the language of the amendments is quite clear.
Another round of the vicious circle was begun, this time by
limiting as far as possible the language of the amendments.
Many cases might be cited to support this view, but the
hardest blow to liberal minded persons-the biggest step
backwards into {lays of slavery-was t.he decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson" 163 U.S. 537 [16 S.Ot. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256]. That
case invOlved a Louisiana statute which provided that railroads must provide "equal but separate" accommodations
for white and colored passengers, and that, under penalty,
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no member of either group should be permitted to use the
accoDlmodations provided for the other. The Supreme Court
upheld the statute, and laid down the rule that the state had
power to make regulations of this kind" in good faith for the
promotion of the public good." The court also said that the
question came down to the "reasonableness of the regulation!' (Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, p. 537.) By using that
language, however, the Supreme Court left the door open for
a future, more enlightened generation. For, if the reasonableness of the regulation is the only test, it may and will
happen that a regulation was reasonable from the point of
view of the Legislature enacting it and the court first passing
on it. And yet, in the light of future developments, all
the reasonableness may have been lost and the regulation
may have reduced itself to a mere tool of oppression-a hangover from quaint and superstitious days of yore. There are
pnough statutes of this kind to fiB periodically a column in
Collier's magazine. Most statutes thus rendered obsolete are
not especially vicious, and most of t.hem are not enforced.
I t is safe to assume that most of them would be struck down
today if their constitutionality were challenged, because what
once may have appeared reasonable has become an absurdity.
It is, of course, conceded that the state in the exercise of
the police power may legislate for the protection of the health
and welfare of the people and in so doing may infringe to
some extent on the rights of individuals. But it is not
conceded that a state may legislate to the detriment of a
class-a minority who are unable to protect themselves, when
such legislation has no valid purpose behind it. Nor may
the police power be used as a guise to cloak prejudice and
intolerance. Prejudice and int.olerance are the cancers of
civilization.
It is my position that the statutes now before us never
were constitutional. When first enacted, they violated the
supreme law of the land as found in the Declaration of Independence. It is further my position that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States invalidated the statutes here involved. In 8 powerful dissent in
Plessy v_ Ferguson, .upra, Justice Harlan said, at page 559:
"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
t.olerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights,
all citizens 8re equal before the law. . . . The law regards
l'}18'J 8S man, and takes no account of his surroundings or ()f
his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme
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law of the land are involved . . . the judgment this tIay
rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the
decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case." This
language needs no elaboration. The time at which this judgment has become pernicious has arrived.
Even if I concede, which I do not, that the statutes here
involved were at any time reasonable, they are no longer
reasonable and therefore no longer valid today. The rule is
that the constitutionality of a statute is not determined once
and for all by a decision upholding it. A change in conditions may invalidate a statute which was reasonable and
valid when enacted (Nasktt~7.ze, C. cf St. L. Eg. Co. v. Walters,
294 U.S. 405 [55 8.Ct. 486, 79 L.Ed. 949], 16 C.J.S. 150).
In this case, there are no decisions of either this court or
the Supreme Court of the United States which uphold the
validity of a statute forbidding or invalidating' miscegenous
marriages. As has been pointed out, even if there wert: precedent, it would not necessarily be binding in this case. The
eases from other jurisdictions are, of course, not binding
here. Under the test laid down by the United States Supreme
Court in Pless1/ v. Ferguson, supra, the reasonableness of the
regulation is therefore the decifdvc factor. And there are
decisions rendered in this state which definitely point the
way as to wh"t is to be con.c:;idercd "reasonable." and in accord
with the public policy of this stat.'.
Thhi court hllK upheld thl' valirlity of miscegenous marriages, so-calII'd, when the marriage was entered into in a
jurisdiC'tion wh(\rtl no prohihitir)ll existed (Pearson v. Pear,on, 51 Cal. 120, 125). Under the well-settled rules of the
law of Conflict of Ln.ws, this court could have denied validity
to such marriages, provided they were "odious" to its own
internal policy. It did not do so, and it has indicated in
oth\lr holdings in which the problem of miscegenation was
collaterally involved that it does not consider the internal
policy of this state one which would lead it to refuse validity
to such marriages (Rest. of Contlicts of Laws, § 132 (c».
Some of the statutes of the type here under attack have
been upheld as reasonably designed to prevent race rioting.
The fact that this court grants recognition to foreign miseegenous marriages, valid where contracted, is enough to rebut
that arguinent. Riots would either follow in both cases or in
none. One author sums up the problem by asking: "Does
this not mean that the miscegellation statute applies only to
U C.Jd-24
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those who citht'r have an inadt'qllate knowledge of the law
and/or cannot afford the t.rain fare t.o a state where the
attempted marriage w0111u b~ valid!" (Tragen, 32 Cal.L.
Rev. 269, 277.)
So far as the policy of this court is concerned, there is no
basis for upholding the statutes. But it is said that it is not
the policy of the court but that. of the Legislature whieh
should control. And there again, there are strong indications of legislative trends and intentions which point the way.
So far as employment under public contracts is concerned,
the laws of this state forbid discrimination based on color
(Lab. Code, § 1735). So far as civil rights other than the
right to marry are concerned, they are guaranteed by Civil
Code, section 52. The statutes forbidding miscegenous marriages here under attack are further distinguished from
statutes in other jurisdictions in that they are entirely
dtlclaratory, while all the others carry with them penalties
for violation. This, too, would indicate an attitude of comparative indifference on part of the Legislature, and the
Itbsence of any clearly expressed public sentiment or policy.
The legislation here under attack is also sought to be
sustained on the ground tbat a legislative enactment duly
made and based on "some evidence" is presumptively valid.
The general rule to that effect may be conceded. But it dors
Dot apply to a case of this kind. In cases involving disc rimmation, thr rule is that laid down by the Suprrmc C011rt of
the United States in Knrematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 [65 s.et. ID3, 194, 89 L.Ed. 194, 19!1], whcr~ the
court spcaking through Mr. Justice nlack saiu: " . . . all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect ... courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions:
racial antagonism never can." That suspicion which attaches
to cases involving discrimination is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of validity and constitutionality normally present when a statute is attacked as uncom;titutional.
Finally, the statute is sOllght. to be upheld for "sociological" reasons. The evidence prt'sent«.>d to sustain the
statute and that tending to show it up as unreasonable falls
into two groups. One is concerned with the social effect of
such marriages on the parties and those close to them. That
So.>eial ostrllcism may well result. to the parties and perhaps
their offspring, may be concedrd. But that is something
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which the state is powerless to control and which it cannot
prevent by legislation. It therefore furnishes no basis for
legislation, either. It is something resting with the parties
themselves, for them to decide. If they choose to face this
possible prejudice and think that their own pursuit of happiness is better subserved by entering into this marriage with
all its risks than by spending the rest of their lives without
each other's company and comfort, the state should not and
cannot stop them.
The other aspect of the evidence adduced is the medieoeugenic one. A great deal has been written and said about
the desirability or undesirability of racial mixtures. The
writers seem to be in such hopeless conflict that their lack
of bias may well be questioned. Suffice it to quote th~ following from petitioner's brief:
"The blood-mixing however, with the lowering of the racial
level caused by it, is the sole cause of the dying-off of old
cultures; for the people do not pcrish by lost wars, but by
thf' loss of that force of resistance which is contained only
itl tht' pure blood.
"All that is not race in this world is trash. "
"The result of any cros."in/!, in bricf, is always t.he follo..-ing: (a) lowerin~ of the "tandard of th~ hi~her rae(',
(bj plJysical and mental regression, and, with it, the beginnin!! of sl()\vly but steadily progrcssiyc lin;tcring illness."
"J:\'ery raec-e.l'ossing leads necessarily Rooner or later to
the tIt-cline of th(;' mixed product. The danger for the mixed
product is aboliRhed only in the moment of the bastardizlltion of the last higher, racially pure element. "
" ... [T]here is only one most sacred human right, and
this right iF: at the same time the most sacred obligation,
namely, to Flee to it that the blood is preserv(;'d pure, so that
by its preservation of the best human material a possibility
is given for a more noble development of these human beings."
This quotation is from Hitler's "Mein Kampf" as published in translation in New York in 1940. To bring into
issue the correctness of the writings of a madman, a rabblerouser, a mass-murderer, would be to clothe his utteranees
with an undeserved aura of respectability and authoritativeness. Let U!'l not for~et that this was the man who plunged
the worl<l111to a war in which, for the third time. Am(;'ri('alls
fought, hIed. and died for the truth of the proposition tllat
all lllen are created equal.
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We may take judicial notice of the £act-flince it is •
politiral and historical fact--that steady inroads have been
made on the myth of racial superiority and its outgrowths.
'I'he rest of the world never has understood and never
will understand why and how a nation, built on the premise
thnt all men are created equal, can three times send the flower
of its manhood to war for the truth of this premise and still
fail to carry it out within its own borders.
In 1682, Lord Nottingham said in the course of an opinion:
"Pray let us 80 resolve Cases here, that they may stand with
the Reason of Mankind when thry are debated abroad. Shall
that be Reason here that is not Reason in any part of the
World besides!" (Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch.Cas. 1, 33,
22 Eng.Repr. 931, 935.)
In my opinion, the statutes here involved violate the very
premise on which this country and its Constitution were
built, the very ideas embodied in the Declaration of Independence, the very issue over which the Revolutionary War,
the Civil War, and the Second World War were fought, and
to(' spirit in which the Constitution must be interpreted ill
ort1C'1' that the interpretations will appear as "Reason in
all." part ofthe World besides."
EDMONDS, J.-I agree with the conclusion that marriagp,
is . 'something more than a civil contract subject to regulation
by the state; it is a fundamental right of free men." Morf'over, it is grounded in the fundamental principles of Christianity. The right to marry, therefore, is protected by the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, and I place my
concurrence in the judgment upon a broader ground than
that the challenged statutes are discriminatory and irrational.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84
L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (1940), the United States
Supreme Court, for the first time expressly held that, through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state
st.atute may be declared invalid if it violates the specific guarIlntee of religious freedom as stated in the First Amendment.
The consequences of that decision were forcefully stated by
:\Ir. Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Educafion v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 [63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed.
1628,147 AL.R. 674], as follows: "In weighing argumpnts
of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument
of transmitting the principles of thc First Amendment aud
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those (~a.<lt!S in which it is applied for it~ own sake. The test
of kgimation which collides with thtl Pourtcllnth Amendment,
bl'C:1USC it nlso collides with the principles of the First, is
lUllCh more definite than the test whtln only th" Fourteenth is
involwd. .Much of the vagueness of the due process clause
disappears when the specific prohibitiollS of the First become
it.,; "tandard. The riJl'ht of " State to regulate, for example,
a public utility mlly well include, so far as the due process
test is concerned, power to iruposc all of the restrictions which
a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But
fr<-edom of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship
ruay not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate
danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect."
Reasonable classification, therefore, is not the test to be
applied to a statute which interferes with one of the funda·
mental liberties which are protected by the First Amendment.
The question is whether there is any "clear and present
dang-er" justifying such legislation (Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367,372 [67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546J ; Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 333 [66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed. 1295];
CantweU v. Connecticut, supra, at p. 311; Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242, 256 [57 8.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066] ; Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [39 8.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470]),
and the burden of upholding the enactment is upon him who
asserts that the acts which are denounced do not infringe the
freedom of the individual. (Busey v. District of Columbia, 138
F .2d 5!l2, 595.)
In the present case, the respondent does not claim that
there is any clear and present danger justifying the restric·
tions imposed by sections 60 and 69 of the Civil Code. In 18
stntes, including NeW' York, Illinois and Pennsylvania, where
about 10 per cent of the Negroes of thll United States reside,
there are no such linlitntions. The population of California,
to n large extent, is made up of people who have come to it
from other sections of the country, and if there are undesir.
able consequences of interracial marriages, the challenged
lel"isllltion iR an ineffective means of meeting the problem.
Thl' decisio~s upholding state statutes prohibiting polygamy
come within an entirely different category. In Reynolds T.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 [25 L.Ed. 244], marriage was said
to be, "from its very nature a sacred obligation," but the
conviction was sustained upon the ground that polygamy
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violates "the principles upon whic11 the government of tllf
peoplc, to a greater or less extent, rests." Latcr, tlll' court
characterized the practice of polygamy as beinA' "contrary
to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which
ChriRtianity has produced in theW estern world" (Church
of Jesus Christ of L. D. S. v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 [10
S.Ct. 792, 34 L.Ed. 478] ; see Davis v. Beason, 13:3 U.S. 3:3:l
[10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637)). In effect, therefore, these Cl'.8lS
rest upon the principle that the conduct which th .. lel?i~lntiulI
was designed to prevent constituted a clear and pr"!',f'nt
danger to the well being of the nation and,. for that reasoll,
the statute did not violate constitutional guarantees.

I

SHENK, J.-I dissent.
The power of 1\ state to regulate and control the basic social
relationship of marriu!!c of its domiciliaries is her(~ challent~cd
ana set at nought by :\ majority order of thi:; court arrivcd
at nnt by a concurrt\ncc of reason~ but by tht encl result. of
four vot~s support,.,l by diVt'r:!l'nt. concept" not supported by
authority and in fact contrary t(l th,' decisions in this l;13to
and ~lscwhtlre.
It will bp. shown that su~h law .. havt' bl'ln in cffed in thi~.;
country siner bdorc nur national independenlw anfl in tIlil'l
stat(' Rince our DrRt legi"lluti-..c· sCs'·;ion. They hay. neVl'r b.'CJ\
declared unconRtitution:ll by any court in tht· lunll alth"I1I:11
freqnently they hnve hcen under att;,(\k. It is difficult to M<:c~
why such laws, vulid whml eDlwt.ed ann constitutionally
enforceahle in this state for nearly 100 years and elf;ewhert! for n much lonlZ'er period of time, are now unconstitutionnl under the same Const.itution and with no change in
the factual situation. It will also be shown that they have
a valid leJrlsllltive purpose even though they may not conform
to the sociop:enctic views of some people. When that legislative purpose appears it ill entirely beyond judicial power,
properly exercised, to nullif~' them,
This proceeding, therefore, jJl\'olves a most important state
function long Rince recognized as such. Indf'('d as late as
June 7, 1948, it has bern recognized by the Supreme Court
of the United States "that thl' regulation of the incidents
of the marital relation involves the exercise by the states of
powers of HIe most vital importance." (.~herrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 34H [68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Etl. --].) Bl'ransl' of
the far-reaching effect of au order of this court in connection
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with this basic social relationship thc Bubject is worthy of
somewhat extended discussion in support of our statutes.
According to the verified petition for the writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a marriage license, Andrea
D. Perez is a white person and Sylvester ,S. Davis, Jr., is a
Negro. Respondent county clerk rests his refusal to issue a
certificate and license to them on the ground that he is expressly prohibited from so doing by the provisions of section
69 of the Civil Code, and upon the further ground that their
purported marriage in this state would be illegal and void.
(Civ. Code, § 60.)
Section 69 of the Civil Code contains the following proviso:
". . . no license may be issued authorizing the marriage of
a white person with a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian or member
of the Malay race." And complementary section 60 of the
same code reads: "All marriages of white persons with
negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay race, or mulattoes
are illegal and void."
Petitioners first contend that the above quoted statutory
provisions deprive them of the religious freedom guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal
Constitution and article I, section 4, of the Constitution of
thiR state. Thcy allege that they are members and communicants of the Roman Catholic Church; that it is the dogma,
belief and teaching of the church that a person of thl' white
race and a person of the Negro race, if otherwise eligible,
are entitled to receive conjointly the sacrament of matrimony
and to intermarry; that the refusal of respondent to issue
the license denies to them the right to participate fully in
the sacramental life of the religion in which they believe,
prohibits the free exercise by them of their religion, and violates the guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of their
religious profession and worship. It is further alleged that
section 69 of the Civil Code is arbitrary, capricious and without reasonable relation to any purpose within the competency
of the state to effect.
Respondent on the other hand contends that the classifications contained in sections 60 and 69 of the Civil Code do not
transgress the petitioners' freedom of religious worship; that
such classifications are reasonably designed to promote the
general welfare and the inter{'sts of individual members of the
races mentionpo. ano thl'lt thp rt'gnlation is therefore a proper
exercise of the police powt'r of the state.
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At the outset it may be noted that the petitioners' alleged
right to marry is not a part of their religion in the broad
sense that it is a duty enjoined by the church, or that penalty
and punishment may in some manut'r ensue (cf. B"ynolds v.
United 8tates, 98 U.S. 145, 161 [25 L.Ed. 244]) ; but rather
that their marriage is permissive under the dogma, beliefs and
teaching of the church to which they claim membership and
thnt the sacrament of matrimony will be administered to them
by a priest of the church if· and when a license issues. In
thili connection Father John La Farge, executive editor of
"America," the national Catholic weekly, in a book entitled
"The Race Question and The Negro" (Permissu Superiorum), (1943), states at page 196: "The Catholic Church
doClol not impose any impediment, diriment impediment, upon
racial intermarriage, in spite of the Church's great care to
preserve in ita utmost purity the integrity of the marriage
bond.
"On the other hand, where such intermarriages are prohibited by law, as they are in several states of the Union,
the Church bids her ministers to respect these laws, and to
do all that is in their power to dissuade persons from entering
into such unions."
The foregoing is mentioned to show that the attitude· of the
church. has no particular bearing on the asserted righta of
the petitioners. Its attitude is one of respect for local laws
and an admonition to its clergy to advise. against their infringement.
Other considerations are presented in connection with petitioners' contentions that their religious liberty is being infringed. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibit the free exercise
thereof. The due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment embraces this fundamental concept of liberty as
expressed in the First Amendment and renders the states
likewise incompetent to transgress it. However, this religious
liberty "embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is· absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be." (Oantwell v. Oonnecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 JJ.Erl. 1213. 128 A.YJ.R.
1352]; Mu,.dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 l63 S.Ct.
870,891,87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.n.. 81] ; Gospel A,.my v. City
of Lo. Angeles, 27 Ca1.2d 232 [163 P.2d 704].) It has long
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been held that couuuct, cmnl>jl>t.iug of }>l'lldicel; and acts, rewaiDll Rllbject to regulat.ion for thl' health, safety and general
1I'elfare. For example, a legi:dative determination that
monogamy is the "law of social life " has been held to prevail
over the prac:tice of polygamy and bigamy as a duty required,
elll'ouraged or suffered by religion. (Reynolds v. United
States, supra, 98 U.S. 145; DatJis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
[10 S.Ot. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637] ; CletJeland v~ United States, 329
U.S. 14 [67 S.Ot. 13,91 L.Ed. 12].)
·1'he reasoning behind this construction of the Constitution
is obvious. The determination of proper standards of behavior must be left to the Congress or to the state legislatures
ill order that the well being of society as a whole. may be safeguarded or promoted. The protection of the individual'.
exercise of religious worship afforded by our state Constitution, article I, section 4, corresponds with that furnished by
the federal guaranty as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Oourt. Our Constitution expressly provides that
the free exercise of religion guaranteed "shall not be so construed as to • _ • justify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of this State."
Moreover, the right of the state to exercise extensive control
over the marriage contract has always been recognized. The
institution of matrimony is the foundation of society, and the
community at large has an interest in the maintenanc:e of its
integrity and purity. (Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Oal. 1 [16 P.
345]; 16 Cal.Jur. 909.) The Supreme CoUrt of the United
States has stated: "Marriage, as ereating the most important
relat.ion in life, as having more to do with the morals and
eivili7.ation of a people than any other institution, has always
been Rubject to the control of the legislature." (Maynard v.
HiU, 125 U.S. 190, 205 [8 S.Ot. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654].1 And:
"M.-uTiage, while from itR very nature a sacred obligation, is
nevertheless, in most civilized nntionR, a civil contract, and
usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be
built, and out of ibl fruits spring social relations and social
obImntions and dutie!'>. with whieh government is necessarily
rt:quir(.,a to deal." (Rc1molds v. Unitf'd States, npra, 98
U$. 145, 165.) In the language of the Supreme Oourt of
Millt:Onri: "The right to regulate marri8.fle. the age at which
p,'rRons may enter into that relation, the IQanner in whieh
the ritf'~ may be c('Jebrnted, and. the pel'ROns betwel'n whom it
l11ay be contracted, hlL'I been n.''If;umed and ,'xercised by every
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civilized and Cbric;tilln nation." (State v. Jackstm, 80 Mo.
175, 179 [50 Am.Rep. 499].) ~'urther: "There can be no
doubt R.C; to the power of every country to make Jaws regulating the mnrriage of its own subjects; to declare who may
m:lrry, how they may marry, and what shall be the legal conl'iI.'IJuenee8 of their marrying. The right to regulate the institution of marriage; to cl81i18ify the parties and persons who
lllay lawfully marry; to dissolve the relation by divorce; and
to impose such restraints upon the relation as the laws of
God, and the laws of propriety, morality and social order demand, has been exercised by all civilized governments in all
ages of the world." (Kinney v. The CommonwcaZfh, 30 Gratt.
(Va.) 858,862 (32 Am.Rep. 690].)
It is apparent from what has been ..mid that if the law under
attack bears a substantial relationship to the health, safety,
morals or lOme other phase of the general welfare of the ptlople
of this state, it would not be invalid because ineidentally in
conflict with the conduct and practice of a particular religious
group. Similarly if there is a rational basis for the law, if
it is reasonable, and all within a given class are· treated alike,
there is no violation of the due process or equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (See Missouri ez rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (59 S.Ct. 232,83 L.Ed. 208]; Buck v. B6lZ, 274 U.S...
200 [47 S.Ct. 584,71 L.Ed. 1000]; Radice v. New York, 264
U.S. 292 (44 S.Ct. 325, 68 L.Ed. 690]; Pafson6 v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (34 S.Ct. 281, 58 L.Ed. 539] ; Noble 8fafe
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 [31 S.Ct. 186,55 L.Ed. 112].)
The prohibition of miscegenetic marriage is not a recent
innovation in this state nor is such a law by any means unique
among the states. A short history of miscegenetic marriage
laws in this state and elsewhere will contribute to a better
understanding of the problem at hand. A law declaring marriages between white persons and Negroes to be illegal and
void was enacted at the first session of our Legislature. (Stats.
1850, ch. 140, p. 424.) Section 60 of the Civil Code declaring
certain marriages im'alid has existed since t.he advent of our
codes ill 1872, at which time it extended only to intermarri:w,e
between wbite persons and Negroes or mulattoes. It succeeded
the prohibition against sucb marriages found in thE' abovementioned statutes of 1850. Section 60 was amended in 1905
to include marriages between wllitE' persons tlnci Mongolians
(Stats. 1905, p.554). ThE' provisions of tile law here at-
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tacked have remained unchallenged for nearly one hundred
years and have been unchanged so far as the marria~e of
whites with Negroes is concerned. To indicate that the subject matter is not merely of ancient legislative conRideration
it should be noted that in 1933 the District Court of App~u.l
decided that sections 60 and 69 did not prohibit the marriage
in this state of a white woman and a Filipino-a member of
the Malay race (lfIJ'./a/l v. Los Angeles County, 129 Ca1.App.
267 [18 P.2d 706J). That case was decided on January 27,
1933. Without delay the Legislature amended both sections
to extend the prohibition to marriages also as between white
persons and members of the Malay race. The amendatory
measures passed both houses of the Legislature and were
signed by the governor on April 20th of the same year (Stats.
1933, p. 561) thus rendering nugatory the decision in the
Roldan case-which was the obvious purpose of the legislation. As above indicated the present concern with the legislation is only as it affects marriages between white persons
and Negroes.
Twenty-nine states in addition to California have similar
laws. (Rhodes," Annullment of Marriage" (1945); Charles
S. Manguin, Jr., "The Legal Status of the Negro" (1940).)
Six of these states have regarded the matter to be of such
importance that they have by constitutional enactments prohibited their legislatures from passing any law legalizing marriage between white persons and Negroes or mulattoes. Several states refuse to recognize such marriages even if performed where valid (see Charles S. Manguin, Jr., "The Legal
Status of the Negro" (1940); In re Takahashi's Estate, 113
Mont. 490 [129 P.2d 217J), particularly if an attempt has
been made by residents of a state to evade the law (Eggers v.
Olson, 104 Okla. 297 [231 P. 483] ; 8tate v. Kennedy, 76 N.C.
251 [22 Am.Rep. 683). The infrequency of such unions is
perhaps the chief reason why prollibitive laws are not found
in the remaining states. (Reuter. "Race Mixture" (1931),
p. 39; Rhodes, "Annullment of Marriage" (1945), pp. 101,
102.)
The ban 011 mixed marriages ill this country is traceable
from the early colonial period. For example, Maryland forbade the prat'tice of marring'l' union!': hetween ~l'groes or
Inllians and white persons as early n,,, ] 663. Laws forbidding
marriai!es between Negroes and whitt's werl" passed in Massachusetts in 1705, in Delaware in 1721, in Virginia in 1726,
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aud in North Carolina in 1741. In 1724, it was dc('rera in
Prance that no Negro-white marriages wcre to takt' placoc in
Luuisiana. Most of the remaining stat,*, enactcl! siJllilnr
It:gislation ill the period between the formation of the United
Statc.<; aud the Civil War.
Research has not disclosed a single case where a miscegenetic marriage law has been declared invalid. As stated
in Estate of Monks, 48 Cal.App.2d 603, 612 [120 P.2d 167] :
• 'Many states have statutes prohibiting such alliances, and
we have had presented no instance of successful constitutional attacks upon them or any of them." Not only the
state courts but the federal courts as well have uniformly
su~tained the validity of such laws. One of the most rp-ecnt
decisions upon the subject is that of the Unite.l StatE'S Circuit Court of Appeals for the lOth Circuit in the case of
Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120, 123, decided DeC~1I1ber 18, 1944. The court there said: .. Section 12 [Title 43,
Oklahoma St. 1941], making unlawful marriages between
persons of African descent and persons of other races or
descents is challenged on the ground that it violates the Fo\~r
teenth Amendment. Marriage is a consentient covenant. It
is a contract in the sense that it is entered ointo by agreement
of the parties. But it is more than a civil contract between
them, subject to their will and pleasure in respect of effects,
continuance, or dissolution. It is a domestic relation having
to do with the morals and civilization of a people. It is an
essential institution in every well organized society. It
affects in a vital manner public welfare, and its Clllltrol and
regulation is a matter of domestic concern within each state.
A state h.u; power to prescribe by law the age at which persons may enter into marriage, the procedure essential to
const:tute a valid marriage, the duties and obligations which
it creates, aud its effect upon the property rights of both
parties. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 [8 s.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed.
654]. And within the range of permissible adoption of
policies deemed to be promotive of the welfare of society as
well as the individual members thereof, a state is empowered
to forbid marriages between persons of African desct!nt and
persons of other races or descentso Such a statute dlit'S not
contravene th(' Fourteenth Amendment. "
In Pace v. Ala!Jama, 106 U.S. 503 [1 S.Ct. (j37, 27 J;']~d.
207], the United States Supreme Court had befnre it "
statute of the State of Alabama declaring that "if any white
person and any negro ... intermarry or live ill adultery or
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fornication witL each ot.her, 1';lI"h of thelll lIlllst, 011 cOll\"ietioll,
be imprisoned in tlll' pellih'lIt iary or Sl'ntclwcd to hard lahor
for the county for not Ie,,!> than two nor more than seven
years. " A Negro DIan and white woman had been conviet.('d
in the courts of Alabama of fornication. Upon writ of error
to the rnited States Supreme Court it was contended that
the statute was in conflict with the equal protection of law
clause of thc United States Constitution because ~reHtl'r
punishment was provided than by another Jaw relatin~ to
the same offense committed by peoples of the same race. The
Supreme Court of the United States in upholding the statute
and affirming the judgment of conviction stated: "1'he
defect in the argument of counsel consists in bis assumption
that any discrimination is made by the laws of Alabama in
the punishment provided for the offense for which the plaintiff in error was indict('d when committed by a person of the
African race and when committed by 8 white person. The
two sections of the code cited are e:Qtirely consistent. The
one prescribes, generally, a punishment for an offenst' ('ommitted between persons of different sexes; the other prescribes a punishment for an offense which can only be committed where the two sexes arE' of different races.... Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment presrribE'o
in the two sections is directed against the offense designated
and not against the person of any particular color or race.
The punishment of each offending person, whether'white or
black, is the same. "
In State v. Tutty, 41 F. 753 [7 L.R.A. 50], where a statute
was held not in deprivation of rights under the federal
Constitution, it was said: "The court will not disc-uss the
argtunent of defendantl;' counsel to the effect that the intermarriages of whites and blacks do not constitute an evil or
an injury against which the state should protect itself. This
is a question which has been, ag we have seen, the subject of
repeated judicial deliverances; but it is more properly, in
the opinioll of this court, within the range of legislative duty.
It is enough, for the purpost> of its duty, for the court to
ascertain tllat by a legitimate and st>ttJed policy the Stll1t~
of Georgia has declared such marriages unlawful and void;
for while, in this country, the home life of the people. th",ir
decency and their morality, are the bases of that vast ROcial
strul'ture of liberty, and obediencE' to law. which exriteli ThE'
patriotic pride of our countrymen and the admiration of the
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world, and while these attributes of 0111' citizenship ahoTlld
be cberishrd and protectl'd by all in authority, and the
creaturcs who defy them should be condemned by all, thE'
courts, in their judicial functions, are rarely concerned with
the policy of the laws which are made to protect the community. The policy of the state upon this subject has been
declared, as we have seen, by it.s supreme court as well as by
its statutes, and it is enough to say that this court is unable
to discover anything in that policy with which the federal
courts have the right or the power to interfere."
In Scott v. State of Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, the Supreme Court
of Georgia said of a provision of the state Constitution prohibiting marriages between whites and Negroes, and declaring nIl such marriages void: "With the policy of this law
we have nothing to do. It is our duty to declare what the
law is, not t.o make law. For myself, however. I do not hesitate
to say thnt it was dictated by wise statt'smanship, and has a
broad and solid foundation in enlightened policy, sustained by
sound reason and common sense. The amalgamation of the
rac~s is not only unnatural, but is always productive of
deplorable results. . . . The power of the Legislature over
the !'Iubject matter when the Code was adopted, will not, I
suppose, be questioned. The Legislature certainly had as
much right to regulate the marriage relation by prohibiting
it between persons of different races as they had to prohibit
it between persons within the Levitical degrees, or between
idiots. Both are necessary and proper regulations. And
the rl:'p.'ulation now under consideration is equally so. "
In State v. Jackson, 81lpra (80 Mo. 175), the Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed a judgment sustaining a demurrer
to an indictment charging a white woman with violation of a
Htatute making marriages between white persons and Negroes
a felony. The court said that the law might" interfere with
the tastes of negroes who want to marry whites, or whites
who "'ish to intermarry with negroes, but the State has the
same right to regulate marriage in this respect that it has to
forbid the intermarriage of cousins and ot.her blood relations.
If the St.ate desires to preserve the purity of the African
blood by prohibiting intermarriage between whitt's And
blacks, we know of no power on earth to prevl'nt such legislation. It is a matter of purely domestic concern. The 14th
amendment to the Constitution of the United States ... has
no such scope as set'ms to haY(> been accorded it by the C'iT'('uit
court.... AU of one's rights as a citizE'n of the United States
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will be found guaranteed by the Constitution of the Unitcd
States. If any provision of that instrument confers upon
a citizen the right to marry anyone who is willing to wed
him, our attention has not been called to it. If BUC}l be one
of the rights attached to American citizenship all our marriage
acts forbidding intermarriage between persons within certain
degrees of consanguinity are void ... IT]he condition of a
community, moral, mental and physical, which would tolerate indiscriminate intermarriage for several generations,
would demonstrate the wisdom of laws which regulate marriage and forbid the intermarriage of those nearly related
in blood."
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Egge"s v. Olson, supra
(104 Okla. 297 [231 P. 483, 486]), said: "The inhibition,
like the incestuous marriage, is in the blood, and the reason
for it is stronger still." The court quoted from 18 R.C.L.,
section 31, p. 409, in part, as follows: ". Civilized society
has the power of self preservation, and, marriage being the
foundation of such society, most of the states in which the
negro forms an element of any note have enacted laws
inhibiting intermarriage between the white and black races
... Statutes forbidding intermarriage by the white and black
races were without doubt dictated by wise statesmanship,
and have a broad and solid foundation in enlightened policY,
sustained by sound reason and common sense. The amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but is always
productive of deplorable results. Tbe purity of the public
morals, the moral and physical development of both races,
and the highest advancement of civilization, under which
the two races must work out and accomplish their destiny,
all require that they should be kept distinctly separate, and
that connections and alliances so unnatural should be prohibited by positive law and subject to no evasion.' "
The miscegenation law of our neighboring state of Oregon
(Ore. L., § 2163) was held valid by the Supreme Court of that
state in In"e Paquet's Estate, 101 Ore. 393 r200 P. 911J. In so
holding the court directed attention to 8 R.C.L. section 381
where it is said: "Miscegenation is a purely statutory offense,
consisting in the intermarriage of a person of the white race
with a negro or colored person. Most states in which the
negro or colorf'd people form an appreciable element have
enactt"d tht"se laws inhibiting intermarrying betwef'n the
w}litt· :mo blaek rRf°(,S. Rnn thl' ofi('ns(' t!ll'l"eby creatt'iI is
Uf;l1al1y of tIll' g"l"rHlp (If II f(·l()n~·. Thl'rf' ('an b(' no doubt as
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to the power of overy country to make laws reglllatmg tC\e
marriagt' of its own subjects j to dedare whn may Illarry, flow
they may marry, and what shall be the legal conse4uences
of their marrYing j and accordingly, although miscegenati.)n
statntes have been persistently attacketl on the grlllllul that
they are violative of the United States Constitutioll, they
have been universally upheld as a proper exercise of the
power of each state to control its own citizens." (See also
36 Am.Jur., lfiscegenation, § S.)
The foregoing views are representative of the general tenor
of judicial opinion which has been expressed elsewhere.
Without further amplification reference may be malle to
CaReS in Arizona (8tate v. PlUS (1942),59 Ariz. 16 [121 P.2d
882]; Kirby v. Kirby (1922), 24 Ariz. 9 [206 P. 405]), in
Colorado (JooksO'n v. City and County of Dentler (1942),
109 Colo. 196 [124 P.2d 240]), in Montana (In re Takalu£shi's ERtate, supra, (19-:12), 113 Mont. 490 [129 P.2d 217]
-,Tnpanese-White), in Alabama (Green v. State (1877), 58
AIn. 190 [29 Am.Rep. 739]), in Virginia (Kinney v. The
Commo-nwruZth, supra (1878), 30 Gratt. 858 [32 Am.Rep.
690]), in Indiana (StGte v. O1oson (1871), 36 Ind. 389
[10 Am.Rep. 42]), in Arkansas (Doclsonv. State (1895),
61 Ark. 57 [31 S.W. 977]), in Texas (PrlUher v. State (1tl77),
3 Tcx.App. 263 [30 Am.Rep. 131]), in Tennessee (LnnlU v.
Stflte (1871), 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 287), in Pennsylvania
(Philad.elphitJ ct West Chester R. R. Co. v. Miles, 2 AmLaw
Rev. 358).
The foregoing authorities form an unbroken line of judicial l'I1lpport, both ~tute and federal, for the validity of our
own l('.rl~Intion, :\lld there is none to the contrary. Those
nuthoritit'S :lppC:lr to hnvepassed upon all attacks on ,",'Uch
Jo{rl.'1L'1t.ion on con.'1titutiollnl grounds, but notwithstallding
t.heir unanimity it i"l decL'1red by some of the majority that
t.hllre is n ~rt of racinl discriurlnntion whlch solely formed
the bn.'1is for the enactments and by :mother of the majority
that the con:::titutional guarantee of frcedom of religi(1D has
been infrin~ed. However, it is the law that if there is R())Ue
factual background for the legislation, that circumstance
forms an appropriate reason for the enactments, and it is
then proper to consider the rules of law which govern the
courts in that connection.
In passing upon the "Illidity of any statutory enactmf:nt
the power of tIle courts is not unlimited. It is circumscribed
by wen reeognized rules, some of which as applicable to the
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case are: that all prE'sumptions and intendments are in fn,",or
of the constitutionality of a statute; that all doubts are to
be resolved in favor of and not against the validity of a
statute; that before an act of a coordinate branch of our
government can be declared im'slid by the courts for the
rE'ason that it is in conflict with the Constitution, such conflict must be clear, positive and unquestionable; that in the
case of any fair, reasonable doubt of its constitutionality the
statute should be upheld, and th~ doubt be resolved in favor
of the expressed will of the Legislature; that it is also to be
presumed that the Legislature acted with integrity' and with
a purpose to keep within the restrictions and limitations laid
down in the fundamental law; that when the constitutionality
of a statute depends on the existence of some fact or state of
facts, the determination. thereof is primarily for the Legislature and the courts will acquiesce therein unless' the contrary clearly appears; that the enactment of the statute
implies, and the conclusive presumption is, that the Governor
and the members of the Legislature have performed their
duty, and havp ascertained the existence of facts justifying
or requiring the legislation; that this is true even in the
absence of an express finding of those facts embodied. in the
act; and that the courts may not question or review the legislative determination of the facts. (5 Ca1.Jur., p. 628 et seq.,
and the many cases there cited.) These presumptions apply
with particular emphasis to statutes passed in the exercise
of the police power (11 Am.Jur., p. 1088, and many cases
cited).
A recent statement by t.his court reco~izes the generlll rule.
In In ,.e Porterfield, 28 Ca1.2d 91, 103 [168 P.2d 706, 167
A.L.R. 675], with supporting authorities, it is said: .. Constitutionality of purpose and appliclltion is gcnerRlly to be
presumed. It has often bf'en said that it is only wh~n it
clearly appears that,:m ordinance or !'Itatutc pa'~"~ definitely
beyond the limits which bound thc police power nnd infrinA'~
npon rights securpd by the fundamental law, that it should
bE' declared void."
Pertinent to the immpdiate question is GaZeener v. Honeyc'U,tt. 173 CIll. 100. 104 [159 P. 595]. This court there approved
th(' doctrine announccd in f'!Rrlicr CMes. It was sRid that it
had never since been qUt'st.iont'd t.hat, when the right to enact
a hlW dcp('nd<.: upon the ~xj~t~n(',e of a fRct, the pRRSRge of the
act implies, and t.he concllLcUve presumption is, that the
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exi:.;hlnce of the {Ilet ha.<; bel'n ft.«<:crtained by the legislative
body. (SccnlHo Itt rt Spcttcer, 149 Cal. 396, 400 l86 P. 896,
117 Am.St.u.cp. 137, 9 Ann.Cas. 1105); Jlartin v. Superior
Court, 194 Cn!. 93, 101 [227 P. 762J ; Pacific Go.s & Elcc. Co. v.
Moore, 37 Cal.App.2d 91, 95 [98 P.2d 819].)
It is not within the province of the courts to go behind the
findings of the Legislature and determine that conditions did
not cx~t which gave rise to and justified the enactment. Only
when, beyond reasonable doubt, all rational men would agree
thnt the fuctulll background did not warrant the enactment
of H statute which was ostensibly designed to preserve the
general welfare can we say that a statute if! arbitrary and
capricious. (In rl' Mill(lr, 162 Cal. 687 [124 P. 427] ; People Y.
Georgf,,42 Cal.App.2d 568 [109 P.2d 404].) It is a well settled
rule of constitutional exposition, that if a statute mayor may
.not be, according to the circumstances, within the limits of
legislative authority, the existence of the circumstances necessary to support it must be presumed. (Sweet v. Beckel, 159
U.S. 380,393 [16 S.Ct. 43, 40 L.Ed. 188].) When a question
of fact is debated and debatable. and the extent to which a
special constitutional limitation should be applied is under
consideration, the conclusion JDay properly be influenced by a
widespread and long continued belief concerning it, and
thho is within judicial cognizance. (Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412, 421 [28 S.Ct. 324; 52 L.Ed. 551].)
The Legislature is, in the first instance, the judge of what
is neCla.ssary for the public welfare. Earnest conflict of opinion
maket; it especially a question for the Legislature and not
for the courts. (Erie B. B. Co. Y. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 699,
'101 [34 S.Ct. 761, 58 L.Ed. 1155], citing other cases.) "It is
eSb\blisbed that a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary,
if :my state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
su."t:un it, and the existence of that state· of facts at the time
the law was enacted must be assumed. . . . It makes no
difference that the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed
by ar/lUment and opinion of serious strength. It is not within
the competency of the courts to arbitrate in such contrariety.
• • . And it is not required that we . . . be convinced of the
wisdom of the legislation." {Bo.st v. Van Deman & Lewis Co.,
240 U.S. 342, 357, 365-366 (36 S.Ct. 370, 60 L.Ed. 679], citing
cases.) "We need not labor the point, long st>ttled, that where
le~islative action is within the Roope· of the police power,
fairly ddm1nble ql1esti()n~ as to its reasonableness, wisdom
anti propl'it'ly nre not for thl~ uetermination of the courts, but
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for thnt of tlw )c~islltt.iv\· oo(ly on which resbl the duty and
responsihilit.y of dl'cisioll . . . . W c llIny not tURt in the bAlances
of judieial review till' weight and sufficiency of the facbl to
sustain the conclusion of the legh;lative body ... " (Standard
Oil Co. v. Mary.willa, 279 U.S. 582, 584, 586 [49 S.Ot. 430,
73 L.Ed. 8561, and cited cases.) Underlying questions of
fact which may condition the constitutionality of legislation
carry with them the presumption of constitutionality in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overtbrowin~
the statute. (O'Gorman cf Young v. Hartford F. 1m. Co.,
282 U.S. 251, 257-258 [51 S.Ct. 130, 75 L.Ed. 324].)
Again the United States Supreme Court has reiterated in
Borden', F. P. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, at pagl~ 209
[55 S.Ct. 187, 79 L.Ed. 281] : "When the classification made
by the legislature is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, there is n
presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and one
who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing
by a resort to common knowledge or other matters which may
be judicially noticed, or to other legitimate proof, that the
action is arbitrary. . . . The principle that the StatE> has a
broad discretion in classification, in the exercise of its power
of regulation, is constantly recognized by this Court." (People
v. Western Fruit Growers, 22 Cal.2d 494, 506-508 [140 P.2d
13]; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 106, 122 [116
P. 557] ; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. County of Los Angel-es, 160
Cal. 129 [116 P. 566].) Whether the legislation is wise or unwise as a matter of policy is a question with which the courts
are not concerned. (Home Bldg. cf L. Assn. v. BlaisdeU, 290
U.S. 398, 447-448 [54 8.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413, 88 A.L.R.1481].)
Courts are neither peculiarly qualified nor organized to determine the underlying questions of fact with reference to
which the validity of the legislation must be determined.
Differing ideas of public policy do not properly concern
them. The courts have no power to determine the merits of
conflicting theories, to conduct an investigation of facts bearing upon questions of public policy or expediency, or to sustain or frustrate the legislation according to whether they
happen to approve or disapprove the legislative determination of such qnestions of fact. (Norman v. Baltimore cf O. R.
Co., 294 U.S. 240 [55 S.Ct. 407,79 L.Ed. 885,95 A.L.R. 1352],
affirming 265 N.Y. 37 [191 N.E. 726, 92 A.L.R. 1523]; 11
Am.Jur. pp. 823, 824, and cases cited; see article, "JudiciaZ
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Dctl'rmination of Qucstionsof Fact Affeoting the Constitu
tional Validity of Legislative Action," 38 Harv.L.Rev. 6.)
The fllct that the finding of th~ Legislature is in favor of the
truth of one sidt: of a matter as to which there is still room for
d.i1ferenct: of opinion is not material. What the people's
legislativ~ represtmtatives believe to be for the public good
must be accepted as tending to promote the public welfare.
It has been said that any other basis would conflict with the
spirit of the Constitution and would sanction !lleasures opposed to a republican form of government. (Atlantic Coast
.uno B. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 [34 S.Ct. 829, 58 L.Ed.
1312] ; 'Viemeister v. White, 179 N.Y. 235 [72 N.E. 97, 103 Am.
St.Rep. 859, 1 Ann.Cas. 334, 70 L.R.A. 796]; State ex rel.
Sullivan v. Dammann, 227 Wis. 72 [277 N.W. 687] ; Stettler
v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519 [139 P. 743, Ann.Cas. 1916A 217,
L.R.A. 1917C 944], affirmed 243 U.S. 629 [37 S.Ct. 475, 61
L.Ed.937].)
Text and authorities which constitute the factual basis for.
the legislative finding involved in the statute here in question
indicate only that there is a difference of opinion as to the
wisdom of the policy underlying the enactments.
Some of the factual considerations which the Legislature
could have taken into consideration are disclosed by an
examination of the sources of information on the biological and
sociological phases of the problem and which may be said
to form a background for the legislation and support the
reasoning found in the decisions of the courts upholding similar statutes. A reference to a few of those sources of information will suffice.
On the biological phase there is authority for the conclusion
that the crossing of the primary races leads gradually to
retrogression and to eventual extinction of the resultant type
unles.c; it is fortified by reunion with the parent stock. (W. A.
Dixon, M. D., Journal of Ameriean Medical Association, vol.
20, p.1 (1893) ; Frederick L. Hoffman, statistician, Prudential
Life Insurance Co. of America, American Economics Association, vol. 11 (1896) "Race Traits and Tendencies of the
American Negro"; C. E. Woodruif, "The Expansion of
lli\Cf'S" (1909).) In September. 1927, in an article entitled,
"ltace Mixture," which appeared in "Science," volume 66,
-~ X, Dr. Charles B. Davenport of the Carnegie Foundation
of Washington, Department of Experimental Evolution, said:
"In the absence of any unifornl rule 8S to consequences of race
crosses, it is well to discourage it except in those eases where, as
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in thl' Hawaiian-Chinese crosses, it clearly produce...; supcrior
progeny," and that th~ Negro-white and Filipino-Europcnn
crosses do not seem to fallv.ithin the exception.
In volUlllt! 19 of the Encyclopedia Arueric.'UuL (1924), PIWC
275, it is I!iIlid: "The result'J of racial inter1U~e have huen
exceedingly variable. Sometimes it has produced a better
race. This is the Cl.'\Se when the crossing has been between
different but closely allied stocks. . . . Prof. U. G. Weatherly
writes: 'It is an unquestionable fact that the yellow, :u; well
as the negroid peoples possess many desirable qualities in
which the whites are de1icient. From this it has been argued
that it would be advanta,..noeous if all races were blended into
a universal type embodying the excellencies of each. But
scientific breeders have long ago demonstrated thtlt the most
dt$kahle results are secnred by specialiY.ing types rather thaD
by merging them.
" 'The color line is evidence of an attempt, based on instinctive choice, to preserve those distinctive values which a racinl
group hns come to regard as of the highest moment to itself.' "
In an addresg before the Commonwealth Club of California
on July 9, 1948, Mr. William Gemmill, South African delegate to the International Labor Organization and one well
acquainted with social conditions and sociological manifestations in that continent, made the stateJ.Qent that in South
Africa, where the European population is greatly outnumbered
by the natives, both cl81:1Ses are adamunt in opposition to
intermarriage and that the free mixing of all the races could
in fact ouly lower the general level.
A collection of data and references on the result of miscegenation is found in "The Meuace of Color" (1925) by J. W.
Gregory (F.R.S., D.Se., Professor of Geology in the Univer,nty
of Glasgow). On PBbre 227 he says that the intermixtures which
have bl-oen bcneficial to the progress of mankind have been between nearly related peoples and that the. results of a mixture
of v.idcly divergent &took serve to W:&l'Il against the misccgelll\tion of dil.-tinct races. Dr. J. A. Mjoen of the Windercn Laboratory, Norw:ty, js credited by Professor Gregory (at p. 229)
with the conclusion from special studies that the evidence is
sufficient to call for immediat~ action &V:1in.crt the intermarriage
of '?tidcly dit.1inct races. Gregory st.'1tes that where two !'uch
rtlCes :u-e in contact the inferior qu:ilities nre not bred out, but
may be umph:u:v,cd in the progeny, a principle widely expreQ;ed in modem eugenic literature. Similnr views asserting
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the unfortunate result!) of croSlilings between dissimilar races,
including the American Negro-white, are ascribed by t.he
author to Prof. H. Lundborg (1922); E. D. Cope, American
geologist; Elwang (1904); Prof. N. S. Shaler (1904); Emile
GaborillU and Gustav Le Bon, France; F. L. Holfman of the
Prudential Insurance Co. of America (1923); Prof. A. E.
JenkKj and Herbert Spencer (1892).
In March, 1926, the Carnegie Institution of W a.~hinlrton,
D. C., Accepted u gift from one who expressed his intcreflt
in tho problem of race eros...inl!' with special reference to its
&{rnificl1ncc for the future of any country containinJ!' n
mixed population. The work wa..~ undertaken by th~ Department. of Genetie::, Carnegie Institution. An advisory committoe W:l.~ orf!'anized .con...istinp; of W. V. Bin$!"ham, Charles
B. Davenport, E.L. Thorndike, I:Uld Clark Wis.<der. )fr.
Morri.. StegJ!'erda wa.~ selected a~ field investil?ator. Mr. StegflCl'da had had excellent training in genetic!! and psychology,
I:Uld had shown u marked fitne.CIS for the st.udy and analysis
of the individual. The main project was carried out in
JamruC:l, B.W.I., by studying in detail and comparatively,
100 each of adult!;; of full-blooded Negroell (Blacks), EuropeaM
(Whit.cH), and White-Black mh:turesof all degrees (BroWn).
Half of the hundred were of each Flex. In addition to the main
project some 1,200 children of school and preschool age were
observed and measured. Finally in 1929, an extensive report
w:to; published by the Carnegie Institution, in book form
entitled "Race Crossing in Jaru~Lica," by B. C. Davenport and
Morri:. Stc~~crda, in collaboration with others. The results
of their investiaation indicated th:1t the crouing of distinct
rOO(~ ie; biolomcally undl~irable lmd should be disco11rftged.
W. E. Ca...tle, BUH:ley In...titution, Harvard University, in
an article entitled "Biologicul and SocW. CoJlSequenccs of
Race CrOS!;insr," printed in volume 9, Ameri~"Lll Jo11l'DlL1 of
Physical Anthropology (April, 1926), Btatea on page 152:
"If all inheritance of human traitR were aimple Mendeli:m
inheritance, and natural selections were unlimited in ita
action amonl? human populations, then UJll'eIItricted raciAl
int.ercrossiIij! min-ht be recommended. But in the light of our
pre.~l!nt knowlcdS!e, few would recommend it. For, in the
first plncc, much that to; best in hUDIRD existence is :i matter of
social illheritaJll~l', not of biological inbcritanoo. Race C1'O*ings
disturb socinl inberitnnc<.-. Tw&t is one of its worst features."
This then leads to a consideration of the sociological phase.
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The writings of Father John La FllJ'ge, S .•J., are typical of
many who have considered thr' !)uhjef't of raee-crosses from
a sociological stand poi lit. H('fer(')wl' has been made to his
work" The Race Question and the 1':egro" (1943). Under the
heading "The Moral Aspect," he writes: "[TJhere are grave
reasons against any general practice of intermarriage between
the members of different racial groups. 'fhese reasons, where
clearly verified, amount to a moral prohibition of such a
practice .
.. These arise from the great difference of condition which
is usually experienced by the members of the rl'Spective
groups. It is not merely a difference of poverty or rich~s,
of lesser or greater political power, but the fact that identification with the given group is far-reaching and affects innumerable aspects of ordinary daily life. . . .
"'Vhere marriage is contracted by entire solitaries, such nn
interracial tension is more easily borne, but few persons matrimonially inclined are solitaries. They bring with them into
the orbit of married life their parents and brothers and
sisters and uncles and aunts and the entire socinl circle in
which they revolve. All of these are a1Tcctcd by the socinl
tension, which in turn reacts upon the pence and unity of the
marriage bond.
&< Wheu children enter the scene the difficulty is further
complicated unless a complete and entirely self-sacrificingunderstanding has been reached beforehand. And even then
the social effects may be beyond their control. . . .
"In point of facts as the Negro group b~ollles culturally
advallced, there appenrs llO corresponding tendency to seek
intermarriage with other races."
'fhe foregoing excerpts from scientific articles and leg"ru
authorities make it clear that there is not only some but a
great deal of evidcnce to support the legislative determin:ttion
(lust made by our Legislature in 1933) that intermarri~e
between Negroes and whitt'! persons is incompatible with the
general welfare and thertlfore a proper subject for regulation
under the police power. Thcre may be some who maintain
that there does not exist adequate duta on a sufficiently lar(!c
scale to enable a decision to be made as to the effects of tht'!
original ndmixture of whitc nnd Ncg-ro blood. However, lc~is
lnt~rs are not required to wait upon the completion of scil!ntific rc~enreh to determine whether the undl!rlyin~ bcts carry
sufficient weight to more fully snstain the regulation.
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J.\ review of the ~ubject indicates th:.t.t the !;htutory cl:\SSific:ttiull W:IS deterwiul'u by the Lcgi:;lature in the li~ht of all
the <:irculll~tauecs Ilud requireulCnts (see ruso CuUfurlliu PhySit:ifInS' Sf'Tl:ic;e v. Garrison, 28 Ca1.2d 790, 802 [172 P.~d 4,
167 A.L.R. 306] ; Livingston v. Roll·inson, 10 Ca1.2d 730 [76
P.2d 119::l]) ; that under our tripartite system of govcrnment
this court lllay not. substitute its judgment for that of the
Lcgislaturt! as to the nccel'Sity for th,' cn:lCtlllcut whcrl' it.
Wa.s, as hc:rr, based lIpon cxistiug cOllditiom. aud scientific
data and Ll'lic:f; that. eYen in the field of fundamental rights
it has always be,'ll rccol,.'llized thnt where the Legislature has
npprnispd a particular situation nnd found a specific condition su1'fich'lltly important to justify re~ulation, such determination is giveu great weight when the law is challenged
on coru;titutional grounds.
ThoS(' favoring present day amalgamation of these distinct
rac••g irrt'.Spective of scientific data of a cautionary nature
b/.&R{·d upon the experience of others, or who feel that a suppOtOcd infrequcncy of interracial unions will minimize undesirable consequences to the point that would jUJo,1ify lifting
the prohibition upon such unions, should direct their efforts
to the Legislature in order to effect the chang,! in state policy
which they espouse-as was done in Massachusetts in 1843,
Kansas in 18!)!), New Mexico in 1866, WashinJrt,on in 1868,
Rhon., Island in 1881, Minnesota and Michigan in 1883, and
Ohin in 1887.
r.I.'he contention is also advanced that the statute must fall
before the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bectlm,;c of lack of a sufficient showing of clear and prosent danl;!cr arising out of an emer/lcncy. The cases relied
upon nrc Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 [68 S.Ct. 269,
92 L.Ed. - - ] ; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631
[68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. - - ] ; Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi,
3~6 U.S. 80 [65 S.Ct. 1483, 89 L.Ed. 2072] ; Hirabayashi v.
Unitfd States, 320 U.S. 81 [63 S.Ct. 1::J75, 87 L.Ed. 1774];
M'i'<souri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, supra, 305 U.S. 337;
WiLUam8 v. IntfJrnational dc. of Hoilermakers, 27 Ca1.2d 586
[165 P.2d 903] ; and James v. Marinsh'ip Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721
[lG5 P.2d :129, 160 A.L.R. 900] (sec also Shelley v. Kraemer
and McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 [68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Rd.
- ] ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 [68 S.Ct. 847, 92 L.Ed.
--J ). Thest' cuses, in g-eneral, hold that Ie/lislation discrimil1atill~~ <ll!ainst particular persons, or groups of persons beealU;C of rael', must Ita\'\' t'x('l'ptional cireurnstances or some
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compelling necessity as the 80Urce of enactment. These cases
bve betan "nnlyzed. They have widely diverJlent factual
blWkgroUllJs :wd Me not coutrolliug. UI'rl.' thcre is no lack of
cql1al treatll1t'nt. Seuti\)n.; 60 aud G9 uf our Civil Code do not
dis(lriminate agaWst Jl"r.rons of either the white or Negro
l'at"t'8. (PtICll V• .A.l4bfl.fM, ,upra, lOG U.S. !)1S8; J ac'k8nn v.
Cilyand Cwnl" 0/ DPfwer, ""pf'a, 109 Colo. 196 [124 P.2d
24.0] ; 1. re PGlJfU'" 1:.t.lte,
101 Ore. 393 [200 P.
911].) Bach petitiout1l' h:bI the right and the privilege of
marrying within his or her uwn In'uup. The regulation does
not rest solely upon " difference in race. The question is not
merely one of difference, nor of superiority or inferiority,
but of consequence and result. The underlying factors that
constitute justification for laws against miscegenation closely
parallel those which SllStain the validity of prohibitions against
incest and incestuous marri~es (Pen. Code, § 285; Civ. Code,
§59;42 C.J.S., Incest, §l), and bigamy (Pen. Code, §281;
Civ. Code, § 61; Daw v. B6tJ8Of&, supra, 133 U.S. 888; B,.."noldl v. U.iled Sial", supra, 98 U.S. 145). Moreover the argument b~ed upon equal protection does not take into proper
account the t'.xtensive control the state has always exercised
ovt'r tha marriage contract, nor of the further fact that at the
'Very time the Constitution of the United States was being
formulated miscegen:ltion was cons.idered inimical to the
public good and was frowned up~>n by the colonies, and continued to be 80 regarded and prohibited in states having any
substantial admixture of population at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted. In view of this fact, and the
unanimity of judicial decision sustain:in:g such statutes, it
seems impossible to believe that any constitutional guaranty
was intended to prohibit this legislation.
It has been suggested that sections 60 and 69 of the Civil
Code are unconstitutional because not aufticiently comprehensive. More specifically it is said that such legislation does
not preclude the possibility of progeny as a result of purported marriages entered into by persons who have concealed or failed to disclose their racial origin, nor the possibility of illegitimate progeny of mixed matings or of issue from
such ra.cially mixed marriages validly contracted in other
statt's by residents of this state. HOli'cver it is definitely established that the states, in seeking a remedy, are not required
to extt'nd regulation to all ('aReS which might possibly be
reached. (Badice v. New York, supra, 264 U~S. 292.) "They
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may mark and set apart the classes and type!; of problems
uccol'lling tl' the needs and as dictatell or IHl}!gt'l;lt'd by expe·
rience." (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,540 l62 8.Ct.
1110, 86 L.Ell. 1655]; Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63
[49 S.Ct. 61, 73 L.Ed. 184].) The equal protection clause
does not prevent the Legislature from recognizing •• degrecs
of evil." (Tigner v. ~l'exas, 310 U.S. 141 [60 S.Ct. 879, ~4
L.Ed. 1124] ; 7'ruax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 [36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed.
131].) Nor is the Legislature prevented by the equal protection clause from confining "its restrictions to those classes of
cases where the need is deemed to be clearest." (Miller v.
Wilson, 236 U.s. 373, 384 [35 S.Ct. 342, 59 L.Ed. 628].)
"[W]here a given situation admittedly presents a proper
field for the exercise of the police power the extent of its invocation and application is a matter which lies very largely
in legislative discretion." (Zahn v. Board of Public Works,
195 Cal. 497, 514 [234 P. 388].) The need for prohibiting
all miscegeny, together with administrative impracticalities
inherent in any such attempt, were proper matters for the
Legislature to consider. And the fact, if it bea fact, that
some people contract such marriages within this state illegally,
or others contract such marriages validly outside the state
and subsequently reside here, does not lend support to any
contention of unconstitutionality of the statute.
Finally, it is argued that sections 60 and 69 are too vague
and uncertain to constitute valid regulation in that they lack
definitions of descriptive terms. such as mulatto, and are
uncertain as to the mode of proof of race. After almost
100 years of continuous operation of the present and
preexisting similar laws, the claimed obstacles to the application of the statute are more theoretical than real. In any
event the contention is not a matter for consideration in this
proceeding. In the application for a marriage license t.he
petitioner Perez states that she is a white person and the
petitioner Davis states that he is a Negro. The petition for
the writ contains allegations of the same facts. Therc is
thcrefore no indefiniteness in the code sections that cnn avail
the petitioners; nor is there here any problem of proof. It
is the well-established rule that a charge of unconstitutionality can be raised only in a case where that issue is illvolvl'd
in the determil1ation of tht' action, and then only by the
person or a member of the (')aHs of persons adversely affected.
(American }f'ruit Grown's v. Parker, 22 Ca1.2d 513 [HO r.2d
231; In re Willing, 12 Ca1.2d 591, 597 [86 P.2d GG3] ; Jja.l'
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JI'actor <t CO. v. ]lunsrnan, 5 Ca1.2d 446 [5:) P.2tl 177]; People
v. Globe Graill ({; Mill. Co., 211 Cltl. ]2] l2!l4 P. 31; A. ]1'.
Estabrook Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 177 Cal. 767 [177 P.
848 J; Estate of Monks, supra, 48 Cal.App.2d 603, 610-612,
involving the miscegenation law of Arizona-see also Kirby
v. Kirby, supra, 24 Ariz. 9 [206 P. 405] j ann State v. Pass.
supra, 59 Ariz. 16 [121 P.2d 882]-Jackson v. City and
County of Denvef·, su.pra, 109 Colo. 196 [124 P.2d 240],
involving a miscegenation statute of that state.) Here there
is no possible uncertainty in the statute as applied to the
petitioners.
The alternative writ should be discharged and the peremptory writ denied.

Schauer, J., and Spence, J. t concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Oct.ober
28, 1948. Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted for &
rehearine:.
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